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Unchaste and Incredible:
The Use of Gendered Conceptions of
Honor in Impeachment
ABSTRACT. This Note demonstrates that the American rules for impeaching witnesses
developed against a cultural background that equated a woman's "honor," and thus her
credibility, with her sexual virtue. The idea that a woman's chastity informs her credibility did
not originate in rape trials and the confusing interplay between questions of consent and sexual
history. Rather, gendered notions of honor so permeated American legal culture that attorneys
routinely attempted to impeach female witnesses by involdng their sexual histories in cases
involving such diverse claims as title to land, assault, arson, and wrongful death. But while many
courts initially accepted the notion that an unchaste woman might be a lying witness, most
jurisdictions ultimately rejected unchastity impeachment as illogical or irrelevant. In the process,
the gendered notion of honor may have influenced judicial preference for reputation evidence
over evidence regarding specific acts as a form of impeachment. The unchaste/incredible
equation remained viable in the law of rape as courts continued to insist that the victim's sexual
history was relevant to credibility, consent, or both. Although legal reforms have narrowed the
use of sexual history evidence in rape trials, the concept that a woman's sexual virtue signifies her
credibility survives today in moral turpitude law and in the treatment of prostitution as a crime
that bears on credibility.
A U T HO R. J.D. Yale Law School, expected 20o8; B.A. Wesleyan University, 2002. I thank the
following people for the advice and encouragement they have given me at various stages of this
project: Dan Kahan, Jaynie Randall, Richard Re, Naomi Shatz, Alex Stein, Stephanie Kuduk
Weiner, and James Whitman. I especially thank Virginia Kerr for her invaluable contributions
along the way, and my family and friends for their support.
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INTRODUCTION

Our legal system hinges on evaluations of credibility. Whom do we expect
to tell the truth? When will they tell it? And how do we know they are telling
it? These questions must arise, consciously or not, in the mind of any judge or
juror who is asked to evaluate witness testimony. The need to judge credibility
has been discussed by legal scholars and practitioners and addressed in
evidentiary rules dealing with the use of character evidence at trial to impeach
witnesses.' Missing from this dialogue, however, has been an understanding
that the answers to these basic questions about truthfulness have differed on
gender lines.'
This Note shows that as American courts developed rules for determining
what could and could not be asked in order to impeach the credibility of
witnesses, they did so against a cultural background that connected women's
truthfulness to their chastity. A woman's "honor," or her culturally recognized
moral integrity, 3 so depended on her sexual virtue that her credibility suffered

1.

See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 (defining the use of character evidence to prove conduct); FED.
R. EID. 405 (defining methods of proving character); FED. R. EVID. 6o8 (allowing, with

limitations, the use of evidence of opinion or reputation to attack or support the credibility
of a witness); FED R. EVID. 6o9 (allowing the credibility of a witness to be impeached with
evidence of conviction of a crime, subject to limitations); ROBERTO ARON, KEVIN THOMAS
DUFFY & JONATHAN L. ROSNER, IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES: THE CROSS-EXAMINER'S ART
(199o); W.M. BEST, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE AS TO
PROOFS IN COURTS OF COMMON LAW; WITH ELEMENTARY RULES FOR CONDUCTING THE
EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
YOUNGER, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION (1976).

2.

(London, S. Sweet 1849);

IRVING

Feminist writers and legal scholars have, of course, written extensively on the sexual double
standard and gender bias that has existed in both substantive and procedural areas of law,
including the law of evidence. See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN,
WOMEN AND RAPE (1975); Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in
the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1977); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1o87 (1986);

Abraham P. Ordover, Admissibility of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Unlamented
Death of Characterfor Chastity, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 90 (1977); Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the
Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 123 (1992); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogativeand
Privacy, 1O5 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996). These critiques, and others, particularly those of sexual

3.

history evidence in rape trials, have led to important legal reforms, most significantly the
rape shield laws. I am indebted to this scholarship, but this Note addresses a historical
aspect of the issue that deserves closer attention.
For the purposes of this Note, "honor" is a stand-in for those circumstances of personality
that, from an outside perspective, might make a witness believable. As Dean John Wigmore
noted, "That which induces us to believe that a witness is or is not likely to be speaking
truthfully is usually some circumstance of his actual personality." 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,

1856
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from any real or perceived failings of that virtue. Part I argues that for men,
while honor, credibility, and a reputation for truthfulness were fairly
interchangeable in the popular imagination of the eighteenth century, the story
for women was quite different. For women, honor and credibility depended on
chastity and on the reputation for sexual virtue. Because female honor
emphasized women's reputation for sexual purity and not their reputation for
truth telling, truth itself was prescribed differently for women and men.
Women were supposed to appear chaste, so they experienced social pressure to
dissemble rather than present the appearance of impropriety. Men, to the
contrary, were praised most when they were true to their word.
Part II shows how this gender difference resonated in early evidence cases
as courts struggled to regulate the impeachment of female witnesses. While
many courts questioned the rationality of using evidence of unchastity to prove
untruthfulness, particularly just for one sex, others seemed to accept as a given
the probative value of such chastity evidence. Even beyond the question of
relevance, the unique importance of reputation for women's honor resonated in
decisions on the type of proof to be allowed in character impeachmentwhether to allow evidence of reputation or specific acts. Early courts' inability
to reach a consensus on the relevance of a woman's sexual virtue to her
credibility - and, if so, how unchastity evidence should be adduced - illustrates
the resilience of the gendered notion of honor. At the same time, that most
jurisdictions ultimately prohibited lawyers from impeaching female witnesses
with sexual history evidence marks a triumph of legal principle over a pervasive
cultural norm. Unfortunately, this rationalist triumph did not extend to rape
law.
That women who pressed rape charges were typically forced to respond to
sexual history evidence will not surprise readers familiar with the history of
rape law. Modern rape scholarship has effectively documented the gender
biases that permeated the law of rape, biases that included routine permission
to explore the victim's sexual history and thus to undermine her credibility.4
This Note contributes the simple but important point that the link between
female honor and chastity did not arise from the law of rape, but rather
predated and informed rape law's development. Far from originating in rape

A

TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 920, at 298 (2d ed. 1923) [hereinafter WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE).

4.

See, e.g., Berger, supra note 2 (describing the practice of admitting sexual history evidence at
trial and the attendant harm to rape victims). As discussed in Part III, sexual history
evidence, although admitted formally on the issue of consent, functioned to undermine the
victim's credibility by suggesting that she had lied about her nonconsent and by evoking the
cultural link between unchastity and dishonesty.
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trials and the confusing interplay between questions of consent, credibility, and
sexual history, the idea that a woman's chastity informs her credibility so
permeated American culture that attorneys in cases involving claims as diverse
as title to land, assault, arson, and wrongful death routinely attempted to
impeach female witnesses by invoking their sexual histories.' While early
courts sometimes claimed to admit or exclude this chastity-related evidence
depending on its purported relevance to the subject matter of the case at hand,
they did not do so consistently.6
Three points emerge from Part II's review of early law in this area. First,
America's vision of the truthful woman incorporated ideas about her sexual
purity and these ideas informed perceptions of the female witness. Second, the
idea that an unchaste woman was also a lying woman arose in early
impeachment jurisprudence even in cases where the female witnesses were not
the victims of sexual crimes. Third, early courts more often than not thought
independently and carefully enough to reject a sexual double standard for
testing credibility, at least in cases not involving rape.
Part III shows that what seemed like a progressive retreat from the
unchaste/incredible equation halted when the issue was rape. In rape cases,
unchaste and incredible became unchaste and consenting, a development that
might be viewed as a form of "preservation through transformation."7 If legal
logic had enabled many courts to reject the idea that chastity had a bearing on
female credibility, the idea resurfaced when the question was posed as one of
consent. Although the impossibility of drawing a bright line between evidence
admitted to prove consent as opposed to credibility of the victim in a rape case

s.

6.

7.

1858

See Lane v. Commonwealth, 121 S.W. 486 (Ky. 19o9) (reporting the impeachment of the
credibility of a prosecution witness in an arson case with evidence of a reputation for
unchastity); Bakeman v. Rose, 18 Wend. 146, 150 (N.Y. 1837) (reporting an attempted
impeachment of the credibility of a prosecution witness in an assault case with evidence of
prostitution); Jackson v. Lewis, 13 Johns. 504 (N.Y. 1816) (reporting an attempted
impeachment of the credibility of a defense witness in a dispute over a land title with
evidence of a witness's prostitution); Kolb v. Union R.R. Co., 49 A. 392 (R.I. 19Ol)
(reporting an attempted impeachment of credibility of plaintiff widow in a wrongful death
suit with evidence of a character for chastity); see also infra Part II.
Compare Logan v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W. 676, 679 (Ky. 1917) (holding that a female
witness in a murder case could be impeached with evidence of her bad reputation for
virtue), with Shartzer v. State, 63 Md. 149, 152 (1885) (holding that "the prosecutrix could
not be asked the question whether she had previously had connection with another
person").
See Siegel, supra note 2 (arguing that by recasting a husband's prerogative to beat his wife
into a right to marital privacy, the law continued to protect wife-beating even after laws no
longer expressly allowed such conduct).

UNCHASTE AND INCREDIBLE

seems obvious and has been well-documented, courts often insisted that
sexual history was admissible to prove consent in a rape trial, although not
credibility.
Both before the passage of the rape shield laws in the 1970s and more
recently in criticizing those laws, legal scholars and others have pointed out an
inherent illogic and sexism in the law's approach to rape.9 The very definition
of the crime as the "carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will"
meant that courts often required proof of sufficient "resistance" on the part of
the woman." Further, corroboration requirements and mandatory jury
instructions advising that the rape complainant's "testimony be scrutinized
with caution" spoke to the enduring stereotype that "[r]ape [was] ...an

accusation easily to be made, and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended
by the party accused, tho never so innocent."' 2 Scholars have generally
understood this bias to come from the "longstanding suspicion of rape
4
victims" 3 that developed under the "purview of ancient masculine codes"

8.

See, e.g., Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and FederalCourts: A Proposal
for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763 (1986). Professor Galvin puts the connection

nicely: "Evidence that establishes consent by the complainant will simultaneously impeach
her credibility, and evidence that impeaches her credibility will raise the likelihood of
consent." Id. at 775-76.
See Estrich, supra note

2, at lO91 ("Sexism in the law of rape is no matter of mere historical
interest; it endures, even where some of the most blatant testaments to that sexism have
disappeared."); see also Berger, supra note 2;Ordover, supra note 2.
io. Galvin, supra note 8, at 769; see, e.g., Maxey v. State, 52 S.W.2d 2, 3 (Ark. 1899) (including a
jury instruction to the same effect); State v. Shields, 45 Conn. 256 (1877) (listing the "two
elements in the crime [of rape] -carnal knowledge by force by one of the parties, and nonconsent thereto by the other."); see also SusAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 29-41 (1987); Roger B.
Dworkin, Note, The Resistance Standardin Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 68o (1966).

9.

11. See Note, The Rape CorroborationRequirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365

(1972).

12.

Estrich, supra note 2, at 1094-95 (quoting 1MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CRoWN 635 (photo. reprint 2003) (1778)). These rules were eliminated as part of rape
reform legislation in the 1970s. See Galvin, supra note 8, at 769-70 ("In terms of evidentiary
law, reformers ...dispensed with the requirement that the complainant's testimony be
corroborated and with the mandatory jury instructions that her testimony be scrutinized
with caution.").

13.

Estrich, supra note 2, at 1094; see also Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence: Masculine
Norms vs. Feminist Reforms, 19 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 127, 155 (1996) ("The law has

historically considered women alleging rape to be particularly in-credible, and policymakers
and judges developed special evidentiary rules, such as corroboration requirements,
cautionary instructions, and the prompt complaint doctrine, to guard against the possibility
that an innocent man would be convicted on the word of a vindictive, lying woman."
(footnote omitted)).
14.

BROWNMILLER, supra note 2, at 423.
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centered around controlling women, often through the use of violence.'" That
discourse has been powerful within its sphere, but it has not fully accounted
' 6
for the proposition that, for women, "promiscuity imports dishonesty. ,
Section III.A explores the extent to which early rape jurisprudence was formed
by the culturally entrenched equation of unchaste and incredible.
While our cultural definition of sexual virtue has shifted drastically since
the eighteenth century and even since the initial enactment of the rape shield
statutes, the idea that a woman's sexual virtue bears upon her credibility is still
present today. As Section III.B shows, modern courts admit evidence of
prostitution as a crime bearing on credibility. 7 Although prostitution is no
longer defined in gendered terms, women are still far more likely to be
prosecuted for prostitution-related offenses. That evidence of prostitution can
still be admitted to impeach the female witness shows the continuing vitality of
the chastity/credibility equation. Even now, at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, courts decide whether or not to believe women based on
perceptions of their sexual purity.
The cases this Note examines are illustrative, and the conclusions it draws
from them are impressionistic. In the period covered, American courts in
various states were developing a jurisprudence on these evidentiary questions
that was confused and often confusing.1" Close and often almost metaphysical
distinctions were and continue to be drawn. The distinction between evidence
of reputation and evidence of specific bad or immoral acts is one example. This
Note does not propose to survey the law in various jurisdictions on the
questions of gender, sexual purity, and credibility. Instead, it shows that a
connection between the three existed, that it was treated differently by different
courts, and that it continues to be a salient connection today, even though it
may be differently articulated. Honor, in sum, has been and still is gendered.
I.

CHASTITY AS THE THRONE OF WOMEN'S HONOR

Honor is a cultural construct that connotes moral character, integrity, and
trustworthiness.' 9 As such, it often served at least historically as a proxy for

15.

Id. at

16.

Berger, supra note 2, at 16.

17.

See generally infra Section III.B.

18.

See Annotation, Cross-Examinationas to Sexual Moralityfor Purpose of Affecting Credibility of
Witness, 6S A.L.R. 410 (1930).

421-24.

ig. As Professor Gross points out, "'Honor' can mean many things in different societies."
ARIELA J. GROSS, DOUBLE CHARACTER: SLAVERY AND MASTERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM

186o

UNCHASTE AND INCREDIBLE

truthfulness in credibility determinations.2" The more honorable a person was
perceived to be, the more believable he or she was. 2 Importantly, as American
evidence jurisprudence began to develop in the nineteenth century and courts
grappled with the need to make rules surrounding credibility determinations,
the understanding of honor differed along gender lines. A woman's sexual
virtue was entwined with her truthfulness to such an extent that the two were
often perceived as conceptually identical." Justice Sutherland's majority
opinion in the landmark Lochner-era case Adkins v. Children's Hospital testifies
eloquently, if indirectly, to this reality. 3 In an opinion arguing against special
wage rules for women, he proclaimed: "[F]or, certainly, if women require a
minimum wage to preserve their morals men require it to preserve their
honesty."' The Court apparently considered neither rationale good enough to
overcome the right to contractual freedom, but its characterization of what was
at stake shows how utterly women's sexual purity could and did take the place
of truthfulness.

SOUTHERN COURTROOM

47

(2000).

And, certainly, there were geographic differences even

among the early states in the meaning of "honor." Professor Wyatt-Brown argues, for

example, that as the eighteenth century progressed, "[h]onor in the antebellum North
became akin to respectability" whereas "[h]onor, not conscience, shame, not guilt, were the
psychological and social underpinnings of Southern culture." BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN,
SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD SOUTH 20, 22 (1982).
20.

In 1848, Justice Greene of the Iowa Supreme Court argued against allowing a male witness
to be impeached with evidence that he was "a good or bad man, without reference to his
character for truth." Carter v. Cavenaugh, i Greene 171 (Iowa 1848). Even in jurisdictions
that accepted his logic, however, excluding reputation or character evidence was easier said
than done. See generally infra Part II.

21.

See, e.g.,

STEVEN SHAPIN,

A SOCIAL

HISTORY OF TRUTH:

22.

CIVILITY AND SCIENCE IN

(1994) ("Through the Renaissance and into the
eighteenth century an honorable man and an honest man were interchangeable designations:
'honesty' included the notion of truth-telling but was understood far more broadly to include
concepts of probity, uprightness, fair-dealing, and respectability.").
This Note focuses on an honor system and honor codes developed in middle-class and elite
communities. These codes were not universal, nor could they be, given the wholly different
social, economic, and practical realities of life for poor women, and particularly for black
women in the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, it was the elite's understanding of honor,
inherited from an ancient canon through the common law and European immigration, in
the shadow of which American evidence jurisprudence developed and that informed its
overarching attitudes toward women and credibility.
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 66-74

U.S.

23.

261

24.

Id. at 556.

525 (1923).
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In her 1975 essay, Women and Honor: Some Notes on Lying, Adrienne Rich
wrote that "[h]onesty in women has not been considered important."2 s While
it would be an oversimplification to maintain that honesty itself was not valued
in women, part of Rich's point is that it was sexual virtue, not honesty as such,
that traditionally formed the substance of a woman's honor.26 A woman's
moral integrity was defined by her ability to remain chaste, run an efficient
household, remain true to her husband, and guide men by her influence in the
27
home.
Rich describes women's honor as having to do with "virginity, chastity,
[and] fidelity to a husband. ,,2 The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) provides
a similar definition for the honor "of a woman": "[c]hastity, purity, as a virtue
of the highest consideration; reputation for this virtue, good name."" The
dictionary provides no parallel definition for specifically "male" honor, leaving
the impression that all other definitions, by default, refer to men and not
women. The OED's examples of the uses of these definitions show how the
definitions equate honor with truth and justice, and even specifically with men.
For example: Wordsworth writes, "Say, what is Honour? Tis the finest sense
Of justice which the human mind can frame."31 In a 1708 example from
Susanna Centlivre's Busie Body, honor as a bond interacts directly with the
female form of honor-chastity. Mrs. Centlivre is quoted as follows by the

25.

Adrienne Rich, Women and Honor: Some Notes on Lying, in ON LIES,
SELECTED PROSE 1966-1978, at 185, 186 (1979).

26.

See, e.g., GROSS, supra note 19, at 49. Professor Gross writes that women's honor in the
antebellum South was "approximately synonymous with sexual virtue and purity." Id.

27.

Harriet Beecher Stowe and Sarah Josepha Hale, among other American writers on
domesticity in the nineteenth century, espoused the popular view that, just as a woman's
place was as a moral beacon in the home, an "efficiently run, morally uplifted home would
save the American republic from degradation." Michael Goldberg, Breaking New Ground:
18oo-1848, in No SMALL COURAGE: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 179, 195

28.

SECRETS, AND SILENCE:

(Nancy F. Cott ed., 2000).
Rich, supra note 25, at 186.

29. 7 OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 357 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989)

[hereinafter OED].
30. Id. Honesty is not specifically mentioned in the definition of honor. Yet the definition of
honesty refers to honor. Thus the first definition given for "honest" is "the quality of being
honest," which is further explained in terms of honor. In the third example, the OED refers
to "honour gained by action or conduct; reputation, credit, good name." Id. at 349; see also
GROSS, supra note 19, at 49 ("Central to Southern white male honor culture, like its

antecedents in traditional English honor culture, were '[t]he concept and practice of truth."'
(citing SHAPIN, supra note 21, at 67)).
31. 7 OED, supra note 29, at 357 (citing WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, Untitled Sonnet, in SHORTER
POEMS, 1807-1820, at 52 (Carl H. Ketcham ed., 1989) (18o9)).

1862
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OED, "He had given her his Honour, that he never would ... Endeavour to
know her till she gave him leave."32 The man's honor is his bond, his sworn
statement to respect the woman's honor, her chastity. If he does not hold to his
promise, he will have dishonored himself by being false.33 Thus, the oath, truth
telling, and a sense of justice all combine to form a male morality that emerges
in stark contrast to the prescriptions of chastity and purity that define female
honor.
Early references to honor in American jurisprudence show that "[h]onor
was indisputably a gendered system."34 A selection of pre-190o cases reveals
that when referring to transactions among men, advocates and judges
commonly and unselfconsciously employed the term honor to convey the idea
that a man will be true to his word.3" Justice Greene, writing for the Iowa
Supreme Court in 1848, attempted to chart the relation between honor and
honesty for men. According to the Justice, honesty was a necessary, though not
a sufficient element of honor. Thus, though "to be honorable, a man must be
'' 6
strictly honest; still, he may be honest without being honorable. ,
Nonetheless, a dishonorable man would generally be perceived as
untrustworthy. For this reason, siblings would go to great lengths to "save the

32.

Id. (citing Susanna Centlivre, The Busybody, in

FEMALE PLAYWRIGHTS OF THE RESTORATION

293, 305 (Paddy Lyons & Fidelis Morgan eds., 1994) (1749)).
33.

A similar definition of male honor can be found in the "Code of a Gentleman" of the
Virginia Military Institute cited by Justice Scalia in his dissent in United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515,

34.

35.

36.

602-03

(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The "Code of a Gentleman" of the

formerly all-male institution began by stating, "The honor of a gentleman demands the
inviolability of his word, and the incorruptibility of his principles." Id. at 602.
GROSS, supra note 19, at 49. The fact that prescriptions for male chastity do not surface as
part of the definition of male honor no doubt reflects the double standard that historically
prescribed premarital virginity for women but not for men. In the early United States,
"virginity before marriage was expected" for women. Goldberg, supra note 27, at 187. At the
same time, "most Northern males ... had sexual experience before marriage," and
particularly in the South, "[y] oung men made sexual experience a point of honor." WYATTBROWN, supra note i9, at 294-95.
See, e.g., Smith v. Richards, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 26, 31-32 (1839) ("[B]elieving the appellant to
be a man of strict honour, honesty, truth, and veracity, he reposed the most implicit faith in
his declarations.. .. "); Monroe Mercantile Co. v. Arnold, 34 S.E. 176, 177 (Ga. 1899) ("The
undersigned members of said company pledge their honor as gentlemen to execute and
deliver to the payee or holder of this note ... a mortgage on all the assets of said
company.
); Loomer v. Wheelwright, 3 Sand. Ch. 135, 146 (N.Y. Ch. 1845) ("There was
no promise or condition, but he trusted to Mr. Wheelwright's honor."). In a sampling of
cases taken from a set of almost 3500 pre-19oo cases returned in a Westlaw search for
"honor" (excluding certain phrases, such as "your honor"), the vast majority refer to a man's
honor as indicative of his faithfulness to an oath.
Carter v. Cavenaugh, 1Greene 171,175 (Iowa 1848).

117:1854
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honor" of a defaulting brother by paying or taking on his debts.3 7 The resulting
loss of credit in the community was so severe that it was to be avoided at all
costs.

38

References to women's honor in pre-19oo cases do not invoke the
transactional oath or bond. 9 As the OED definition predicts, the word "honor"
as applied to women, when it did come up in the courtroom, meant chastity or
fidelity to a husband. The argument in a mid-nineteenth century New
Hampshire breach of promise suit highlights the conceptual divide between
male honor, or bond keeping, and female honor, or chastity. 4° The male
plaintiff had accused a woman of breaching her promise to marry him and
offered evidence to show she had instead married another man. In seeking to
exclude that evidence, the defense lawyer argued that it would only be relevant
if it "went directly to prove acts inconsistent with the honor" of his client. 4' By
invoking his client's honor, however, the attorney did not mean to refer to
whether or not she broke her word. Instead, he used the word to refer to her
chastity, arguing that the prosecution's evidence was irrelevant since it could,
at most, prove acts of unchastity, not her marriage to the other man. Thus,

Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 503, 561 (1846); see also Morris v. Terrell, 23 Va. (2
Rand.) 6 (1823) (Coalter, J., dissenting) ("Charles Terrell, to save the honor and credit of
").
his brother, took in the bill, and gave his own bond ....
38. The rare instance in which a man's honor shows up as unrelated to his bond in these early
case reports tends to come at the intersection of male and female honor, in seduction and
breach of promise cases. In those cases, the injury to a wife or daughter's honor has reflected
back upon her family, damaging a father or husband in the process. See, e.g., Brownell v.
McEwen, 5 Denio 367, 369 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848) (holding that a father may receive damages
in a seduction action as "reparation to [his] injured honor"). This understanding of the
importance of a woman's honor to the men with whom she associates dates back to ancient
times and was reinvigorated by the Humanists who believed that "[w] ives, by their actions,
and in particular by their sexual behavior, brought honor or dishonor to the man and his
family." 2 BONNIE S. ANDERSON & JUDITH P. ZINSSER, A HISTORY OF THEIR OWN: WOMEN
IN EUROPE FROM PREHISTORY TO THE PRESENT 28 (1988). The dishonor derived in part from
men's role as "proprietors and protectors" of female virtue. WYATt-BROWN, supra note 19,
37.

at 294.

39. That women were not an enfranchised part of the contractual world of business during that

time goes some way toward explaining this discrepancy. When they worked outside the
home, women were typically employed as factory workers, domestic servants, teachers, or
similar positions. See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 187-95. For a comprehensive exploration of
the doctrine of "separate spheres" and its operation on the daily lives of women in the latter
half of the nineteenth century, see

JULIE HUSBAND & JIM O'LOUGHLIN, DAILY LIFE IN THE

INDUSTRIAL UNITED STATES 1870-19oo, at 99-119 (2004).
40.

41.

Pettingill v. McGregor,
Id. at 183.
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even when a woman's pledge was the issue in the case, when defense counsel
spoke of her "honor," he did so to connote chastity, rather than truthfulness.4 2
Not only were women supposed to be chaste, loyal, and pure; they were
also supposed to maintain a reputation for being so. The late-eighteenth and
early-nineteenth century discourse on women's honor illuminates the tension
between valuing reputation and valuing truth telling in its own right. 43 JeanJacques Rousseau elaborates one of the most repercussive views of the "moral
difference between the sexes" in Lmile, his influential treatise on education. 44
Available in translation in late colonial America and in the early years of the
Republic, Rousseau's "work on women had very definite and far-reaching
American influence." 4s According to Rousseau, the key to female virtue lies
equally in the thing itself and in its appearance. He justifies his claim that
women must maintain both their chastity and their reputations by referring to
the difficulty of establishing paternity. If a woman does not preserve her
reputation, a husband may doubt his wife's fidelity. 4 6 This doubt can in turn

42.

Another early New York case, Cruger v. Cruger,5 Barb. 225 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849), shows a
further nuance in the nineteenth-century concept of female honor. Hendrik Hartog tells the

full story of this contentious marital property case in

MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA:

A

HISTORY 176-92 (2000). At issue was whether a wife had been coerced into assigning to her
husband half of her own property, which he had originally agreed to reserve to her in trust.
The court reasoned that "[i]t could not have been considered an abuse of her power, to
devote a portion of her income ... to promote the welfare and advance the interests of one
whom she had solemnly promised to love, honor and obey." Cruger, 5Barb. at 269. The very
marriage contract in which traditionally "[t]he husband assumed the payment of his wife's
debts in exchange for ... the wife's marriage vow 'to love, honor, and obey,"' NANCY
ISENBERG, SEX AND CITIZENSHIP IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 172 (1998), meant that
demonstrations of loyalty to a husband would not be construed as other than the natural
product of wifely devotion, see HARTOG, supra, at 186. Ironically, even as the court asserted
that a married woman could be treated as a "free and independent property holder," it used
the idea of women's oath of loyalty to her husband to support its conclusion. Id.
43. Professor Gross argues that Southern male honor, in contrast to its Northern counterpart,
contained a similar emphasis on appearance. GRoss, supra note 19, at 48 ("Whereas New
Englanders recognized a strong division between external appearances and one's inner,
'true' self, so that reputation could serve only as evidence of character, to nineteenth-century
Southerners, appearances were what mattered." (emphasis omitted)).
44. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU,
45.

MILE 325 (Barbara Foxley trans., Dent & Sons Ltd. 1974) (1762).

PAUL MERRILL SPURLIN, ROUSSEAU IN AMERICA, 1760-18o9, at 76 (1969). Apparently, Justice
Joseph Story often quoted Rousseau and "the peculiar doctrines of this great enthusiast
seem to have deeply affected him." Id. at 35 (quoting 1LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY
75-76 (W.W. Story ed., 18p1)).

46. Rousseau was far from the first to argue for the importance of women's chastity as a
guarantor of paternity. In their history of women in Europe, Bonnie S. Anderson and Judith
P. Zinsser describe how most of the writings and legends about daughters in Greek, Roman,
Hebrew, Celtic, and Germanic cultures focus on the girl's virginity. I ANDERSON & ZINSSER,
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lead to the husband's inability to love his children because he is "haunted by
the suspicion that this is the child of another."4 7 Thus, a husband's doubt of his
wife's fidelity is as damaging as her actual infidelity would be. By such
reasoning, Rousseau completes the path from a woman's failure to appear
virtuous to the disintegration of her family. 48
Using the word honor, Rousseau defines what he sees as the moral
imperative for women. He writes:
Worth alone will not suffice, a woman must be thought worthy; nor
beauty, she must be admired; nor virtue, she must be respected. A
woman's honour does not depend on her conduct alone, but on her
reputation, and no woman who permits herself to be considered vile is
really virtuous.4 9
Unlike male honor, for Rousseau, women's honor depends on "what people
[will] think.""0 Thus, a woman must both be pure and appear to be pure in

supra note 38, at 34. Following in this great tradition, male Enlightenment thinkers "insisted
that chastity was woman's highest virtue and left the double standard of sexual behavior
intact." 2 ANDERSON & ZINSSER, supra note 38, at 118.
47.

ROUSSEAU, supra note 44, at 325.

48. Rousseau's emphasis on appearances for women is born out in the literature of his day and
throughout the nineteenth century. The great heroines of nineteenth century novels
constantly worry about the need to protect their reputations. In Jane Austen's Pride and
Prejudice, Lizzy and Jane Bennet resign themselves to the possibility that they will never
marry after their sister, Lydia, sullies the family name by running away with her lover. JANE
AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 197-99 (Donald Gray ed., W.W. Norton 1993) (1813).
Frances Burney's Evelina, although an extremely innocent young woman, constantly
threatens her own honor by placing herself in apparently compromising social situations,
the most memorable of which is, perhaps, her stroll through the public gardens in the
company of two prostitutes. FRANCES BURNEY, EVELINA 274-75 (Kristina Straub ed., Bedford
Books 1997) (1778). The cultural ubiquity of instructional guides for women further

emphasizes the importance of a woman's reputation to her social acceptability. Conduct
books sought to help women achieve a kind of visible purity necessary for establishing
reputation, which was in turn the key to a successful marriage. For extensive discussion of
conduct books and their role in women's lives, see NANCY ARMSTRONG, DESIRE AND
DOMESTIC FICTION: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE NOVEL (1987); EVE TAVOR BANNET, THE
DOMESTIC REVOLUTION: ENLIGHTENMENT FEMINISMS AND THE NOVEL (2000); SARAH E.
NEWTON, LEARNING TO BEHAVE: A GUIDE TO AMERICAN CONDUCT BOOKS BEFORE 1900
(1994); and WOMEN IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: CONSTRUCTIONS OF FEMININITY (Vivien

Jones ed., 199o).
49. ROUSSEAU, supra note 44, at 328.
50. Id. Of course, Rousseau did not originate this idea. As John Lyly explained in 158o, "All

women should be as Caesar would have his wife, not only free from sin but from suspicion."
JOHN LYLY, EUPHUES AND HIS ENGLAND 313 (1916).
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order to be virtuous. Rousseau goes on to describe a concern for reputation as
the "grave of a man's virtue and the throne of a woman's.""1 By creating such a
startling division between male and female definitions of honor, Rousseau
problematizes truth for women. Whereas men may "defy public opinion" as
long as they do right, doing right is only "half' the task for women. 2 With this
pivotal assertion, Rousseau implicitly denies women the freedom to act on
conscience. By admitting that doing right could involve defying public opinion,
he indicates that society's prescriptions may not always encourage truth. And if
we acknowledge that actual truth and virtue are often misperceived by society,
women's need to maintain their reputations may create the paradoxical
situation in which they are socially required to deceive. Thus, women's honor
not only differs from men's in its emphasis on purity or loyalty to one's
spouses, but it also equates credibility with the appearance of chastity while
ignoring actual truthfulness as an independent value.
In her Vindication of the Rights of Woman, published thirty years after Emile

and a favorite of early feminists in the United States, 3 Mary Wollstonecraft
rejects Rousseau's definition of female virtue precisely because of the insidious
effect it has on truth telling for women. 4 She traces the path from what

51.

52.

53.

54.

ROUSSEAU, supra note 44, at 328. An 1899 New York case recalls Rousseau's vision of a
woman's reputation as the throne of her honor. In a suit for divorce, the court chastised a
male witness who testified that he had had an affair with the plaintiffs wife: "When a man
voluntarily appears in court, and swears away the reputation of a woman, who, as he claims,
has sacrificed her honor for him, his testimony should be viewed with suspicion." Fawcett v.
Fawcett, 61 N.Y.S. lo8, lo9 (Sup. Ct. 1899). In this case, the word honor functions in a
gendered way as a synonym for fidelity to a husband. Rather than take the side of the
husband, however, Fawcett emphasized the sacred status of a woman's reputation for virtue.
This move can also be interpreted as the court's striving to protect the institution of
marriage and to reserve divorce for cases in which more than one witness could testify to
infidelity or other serious breaches of the marital vow.
RoUssEAu, supra note 44, at 328. Rousseau's conception of male honor, that it has to do only
with internal truthfulness, presents one side of an age-old conflict in conceptions of male
honor. Scholars have argued that the Rousseauian vision of male honor was more prevalent
in the early northern United States, while for white southern men, "[u]pholding honor
required public display." GRoss, supra note 19, at 47; see also, WYATT-BROWN, supra note 19.
Thus, male honor sometimes suffered from the need for its exterior display. Still, it centered
on oaths and truth telling, whether public or private, while women faced the problem of
needing to appear virtuous and chaste in order to maintain their honor.
Wollstonecraft's work reached a large and receptive audience in the United States and
helped lay the theoretical foundation for the first women's rights convention at Seneca Falls.
See THE ELIZABETH CADY STANTON-SUSAN B. ANTHONY READER: CORRESPONDENCE,
WRITINGS, SPEECHES 2-3 (Ellen Carol DuBois ed., rev. ed. 1981).
MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION
W.W. Norton 2d ed. 1988) (1792).

OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN

(Carol H. Poston ed.,
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Rousseau called women's "throne" - her reputation - to deceit. Wollstonecraft
argues that women necessarily lose sight of the divine spirit of truth because "it
is the eye of man that they have been taught to dread.""5 This dread of man's
condemnation or the loss of man's respect is also reinforced by society and its
products. Wollstonecraft explains, "Advice respecting behaviour, and all the
various modes of preserving a good reputation, which have been so
strenuously inculcated on the female world, [are] specious poisons, that
incrusting morality eat away the substance." 6 She eschews the "puerile
attention to mere ceremonies," which she sees as corrupting women's sense of
true values.17 In a perfect society, the good woman and the reputedly good
woman would be the same. In the kind of imperfect society that Rousseau
himself exposes in Emile, however, social prescription and truth are not always
aligned. Thus, Wollstonecraft highlights a logic that meant both that chastity
and truth telling were one and the same for women and that even chaste
women might have to lie in order to keep up appearances and maintain their
credibility. In addition to its likely contribution to the enduring stereotype of
the female liar, s8 this entwinement of chastity and honor meant that for a
woman, if either her chastity or reputation for chastity were lost, her honor and
reputation for truthfulness went with them.
Women's honor, then, encompassed a fraught set of values that privileged
chastity and the reputation for sexual virtue over truthfulness. As a result,
when a woman was "unchaste" or appeared so, she not only lost her honor in
the eyes of her community, but also her credibility.
II.

THE LEGAL HISTORY OF GENDERED

HONOR: EVIDENCE

LAW

If this eighteenth- and nineteenth-century cultural discourse suggests
gendered answers to the basic questions about truth telling - "Whom do we

5S. Id. at 131.
56. Id.
57.

Id. at 133.

58. See, e.g., Amy D. Ronner, The CassandraCurse: The Stereotype of the Female Liar Resurfaces in
Jones v. Clinton, 31 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 123, 125 (1997) ("Custom and law have taught that
women are not to be taken seriously and not to be believed. For most of this country's
history, the law classed women with children and the mentally impaired and forbade us to
own property, enter into contracts, or vote. The rape laws were a codified expression of
mistrust. Although the laws have changed, social science and legal research reveal that
women are still perceived as less credible than men." (quoting Lynn Hecht Schafran,
Credibilityin the Courts: Why Is There a Gender Gap?, JUDGE'S J., Winter 1995, at 5)); Marilyn
Yarbrough & Crystal Bennett, Cassandra and the "Sistahs": The Peculiar Treatment of African
American Women in the Myth of Women as Liars, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 625 (2000).
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expect to tell the truth? When will they tell it? And how do we know they are
telling it?" -then we would expect to see women's credibility being attacked in
court through questions about their chastity or reputation for sexual purity.
Whether this was indeed the case is a question that can be answered by looking
at early case law on the ground rules for impeaching witnesses.59 The form that
impeachment could take, however, remained far from settled as the United
States developed its evidence jurisprudence. As one New York judge pointed
out in evident frustration in 1837, "It is a little remarkable, considering the
great number of times the subject must have come under discussion, that it is
not incontestably settled, what is the precise form of inquiry to be resorted to
for the purpose of impeaching the general credibility of a witness.,,6' However,
one method of inquiry resorted to with frequency and contention was the use
of evidence of unchastity to attack women's credibility.6i
This Part paints a portrait of the early law on the permissibility of
impeaching witnesses with evidence of unchastity. 62 Section II.A takes up two
early cases that shaped American jurisprudence on this issue. One, from
Massachusetts, 6 permitted unchastity evidence to impeach the credibility of a
female witness. The other, from New York,6 4 reached the opposite conclusion
but did so on a technical ground that avoided the core question. Even as these
courts were divided on how to respond to impeachment with "sexual
morality, ''6, their opinions reflect a culture unable to conceptualize the
credibility of women without reference to their chastity to the extent that when

59.

6o.
61.

It is important to note that although the rules for impeaching witnesses differ materially
from those on impeaching parties, particularly defendants, early courts did not always
differentiate between these various types of impeachment.
Bakeman v. Rose, 18 Wend. 146,15o (N.Y. 1837).
See, e.g., Cross-Examination as to Sexual Moralityfor Purpose of Affecting Credibilityof Witness,
supra note 18.

62.

The account given in this Part is not strictly linear because, like the common law they
sought to apply, these cases' import is better understood by analogy than by date. Just as
courts in these early cases almost invariably looked to out-of-state precedent for guidance, I
have paired cases from various states that best articulate major themes. Because cultural
constructs of honor have maintained their vitality even after they had seemingly been
abandoned, the Note also pairs cases separated by many years. Nevertheless, this Part shows
the law for what it was: a cubist portrait, but a portrait nonetheless of a country confronting
difficult questions of proof and entrenched gender stereotypes.

63.

Commonwealth v. Murphy, 14 Mass. 387, 13 Tyng 387 (1817).
Bakeman, 18 Wend. at 147-51.

64.
65.

The 193o American Law Report on the subject concluded weakly that "there [was] rather
abundant authority to support either side." Id. at 411.
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rejecting such impeachment attempts, judges often implicitly acknowledged
that an unchaste woman reasonably might be thought of as untrustworthy.
Section II.B explores the technical question that was at the center of the
New York case: whether a witness's character can be impeached with evidence
of specific acts as opposed to reputation evidence. This question, long familiar
to legal scholars, has special ramifications in cases involving women and
chastity. Section II.C uses Missouri's experience as a case study to demonstrate
courts' movement away from allowing women to be impeached with evidence
of their unchastity. The Missouri cases tell a story whose narrative line is
otherwise hard to trace in the patchwork of cases nationwide. Missouri courts
initially admitted evidence of women's unchastity as bearing on their
credibility but, after almost a century of conflicting case law on the topic,
ultimately disallowed such impeachment. Section II.D outlines the general
movement away from permitting evidence of chastity as a signal of credibility.
Evidentiary principles instructed judges to inquire into the logical connection
between a woman's chastity and her credibility, an inquiry that generally led to
the evidence being excluded as irrelevant or improperly adduced. Ultimately,
this history underscores the extent to which jurists felt constrained by legal
principles to reject a fallacious probative link between a woman's chastity and
her credibility.
The developments traced in this Part reveal three important insights. First,
this country's vision of the truthful woman was fraught with ideas about her
sexual purity, and this vision informed how women's credibility was judged at
trial. Second, the equation between unchastity and untruthfulness entered
early impeachment jurisprudence involving women even in cases where the
female witnesses were not the victims of sexual crimes.66 Third, although
proceeding in fits and starts, states ultimately barred the use of unchastity
evidence to impeach credibility in cases other than rape trials, a surprising
outcome for an evidentiary system that has been criticized as benefiting men at
the expense of women.6 7

While this evidentiary question also arose in the context of sexual assault prosecutions, the
women being impeached with unchastity evidence were often merely witnesses at the trials
of others. This Part focuses almost exclusively on the latter situation. The two exceptions are
both statutory rape cases in which consent was not an issue: in one the victim's credibility
was being impeached, see State v. Apley, 141 N.W. 74o (N.D. 1913), and in the other the

66.

67.

defendant's character was at issue, see State v. Sibley, 33 S.W. 167, 168 (Mo.
See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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A. Setting the Stage: Murphy's Legacy
In 1817, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided in
Commonwealth v. Murphy that proof of unchastity could be used to impeach a
female defense witness in a rape case. 68 Although the recorded account of the
case contains barely over one hundred words and Massachusetts first limited
its holding and then explicitly overruled it in 1846,69 the case continued to have
currency in other jurisdictions for nearly a century.7 For example, thirty-four
years after Massachusetts disavowed Murphy, Missouri used it to strengthen its
own version of the rule that a woman could be impeached with unchastity
evidence. 7 New York, by contrast, firmly rejected Murphy in 1837 as an
anomalous and incorrect statement of the common law. 72 Deployed on both
sides of the debate, Murphy is an obvious starting point and a helpful guide to
judicial attitudes toward impeaching female witnesses with chastity evidence.
Although Murphy was a rape case, the woman the state's attorney sought to
discredit was a defense witness who was allegedly known as a prostitute and
had borne several children out of wedlock. 73 The defendant's lawyer objected to
the use of this evidence to impeach her, but unsuccessfully. The judge ruled
that "[t]he credibility of a witness may... be properly impeached, by proving
her to be of such a character. ' 74 The judge directly linked the witness's chastity
to her truthfulness, observing that "a common prostitute must necessarily have
greatly corrupted, if not totally lost, the moral principle, and of course her
respect for truth and her regard to the sacredness of an oath. ' 7' This argument
followed logically from the cultural belief that a woman who is unchaste has

68. 14 Mass. at 387, 13 Tyng at 387-88.
69.

See Commonwealth v. Churchill,

52

Mass. (1i

Met.) 538, 539 (1846)

(confining

impeachment "to the general character of the witness for veracity"). A mere seven years after
Murphy, in fact, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts began to distance itself from that
opinion, holding that "[e]vidence to impugn the character of a witness [should] be confined
to his general character for veracity" and limiting Murphy to the case of a common
prostitute. Commonwealth v. Moore, 2o Mass. 194, 196, 3 Pick. 2o8, 209-10 (1825).
70. See, e.g., Black v. State, 47 S.E. 370 (Ga. 1904); Craft v. State, 3 Kan. 450 (1866); State v.
Sibley, 33 S.W. 167, 168 (Mo. 1895); State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113 (1883); Bakeman v. Rose, 18
Wend. 148 (N.Y. 1837); State v. Apley, 141 N.W. 740 (N.D. 1913).
71. Grant, 79 Mo. at 133; see also infra Section II.C.
72. Bakeman, 18 Wend. at 149.
73. 14 Mass. at 387, 13 Tyng at 387.
74. Id. at 388, 13 Tyng at 388. The name of the judge who issued this ruling is not given.
75. Id.
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lost her honor. A woman without honor, in turn, could not be trusted to tell
the truth, even when sworn under oath.
Because Murphy involved an alleged "common prostitute," the court's
unwillingness to trust such a witness could be attributable to the perceived
immorality (or illegality) of prostitution itself. The crimes of men, however,
were treated differently. As the New York court noted twenty years later in
Bakeman v. Rose, "[I]t is perfectly well settled, both in [New York] and in
England" that evidence that a person had a reputation for committing crimes,
such as being a "murderer, forger, adulterer, gambler, [or] swindler," could
not be admitted to impeach a witness.76 Such a rule points away from
perceived immorality or illegality alone to explain why prostitution would
signal untruthfulness. Indeed, courts that rejected the use of prostitution
evidence for impeachment pointed out that a reputation for immoral conduct
77
or criminal behavior was not generally admissible to discredit a witness.
Bakeman v. Rose serves as an instructive counterpoint to Murphy. In
Bakeman, a female witness was called to testify for the prosecution in an assault
and battery case. The defendant sought to impeach her with testimony that she
was a common prostitute. Bakeman firmly rejected such impeachment, but it
did so by resting on the form of the evidence. The majority78 explained: "[T]he
general character of the witness alone can be inquired into for the purpose of
impeaching his credibility: that is, what is his general character for truth and
veracity ....But you cannot prove that he has been guilty of any particular

76. Bakeman, 18 Wend. at 148. The Chancellor's opinion in Bakeman cites Murphy, and at this
early date, the courts of the two states shared a fairly common stock of legal precedent. Id. at
149; see also text accompanying note 83. People v. Culter, 163 N.W. 493 (Mich. 1917), a

murder case, places this same emphasis on criminality as central to impeaching men, but not
women. Id. at 496. The case involved the impeachment of the female defendant accused of
murdering her husband. In holding that she could be discredited "upon cross-examination
by showing a want of chastity," the court almost unwittingly articulated a gendered rule: a
male witness might be asked "whether he has committed certain crimes, whether he ran a
saloon.., in violation of law, whether he has been criminally intimate with a certain person,
or whether he swore falsely on a certain occasion..I.. Id. (quoting 40 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
AND PROCEDURE 2616, 2618 (William Mack ed., 1909)). A female witness, by contrast, could
be asked about any type of sexual impropriety such as "whether she is a prostitute, is living
in adultery, or is or has been the kept mistress of a particular man, or has had illegitimate
children, or has kept girls for the purpose of prostitution." Id. (quoting 40 CYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra, at 2614).
7. See, e.g., Jackson v. Lewis, 13 Johns. 504 (N.Y. 1816) (rejecting prostitution impeachment
because an inquiry as to particular immoral conduct was not admissible). See generally infra
Section III.B; infra text accompanying note 188.
78.

1872

In Bakenan, as in many of the early cases discussed herein, the opinions were not designated
as "majority," "concurrence," or "dissent," but instead bore the name or title of the judges
who wrote them. This Note infers the more modern labels for ease of reading.
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crime, or species of crimes, or immoralities .... , By focusing on whether the
evidence used in impeaching the witness spoke to her general character or to
some specific act, the majority left ambiguous how much of its holding was
due to the absence of a connection between truth and chastity, and how much
to the technical form of impeaching evidence.
The concurrence, however, did not hesitate to suggest that a woman's
honor is bound up in her chastity:
[I]f the mode of impeaching her credibility had been to inquire of the
witnesses, first as to their knowledge of her general moral character,
and then whether from such knowledge they would believe her upon
her oath, I imagine it would have been difficult to find a witness,
having any regard to his own character, and knowing her general
reputation to be that of a public prostitute, who would have ventured to
maintain for her the credibility of an ordinary witness.
This nod to the conventional wisdom of the day is particularly noteworthy in
an opinion that praises the rationality of the common law by distinguishing it
from the "Mahomedan or... Hindoo codes, or ... the fastidious refinements
of the Roman law.' ' 81 Yet, even as it lauded the common law for "reject[ing]
the conclusion that a person guilty of one immoral habit, is necessarily
disposed to practice all others, ' 2 the concurrence still implicitly connected
mendacity with unchastity. By its logic, such evidence could reasonably be
admitted so long as it was filtered through the mind of the impeaching witness
who would silently use the knowledge that a woman was a prostitute to decide
that she was not credible.
By assuming that want of chastity signals a woman's willingness to lie in
court, the judges in Murphy, and even Bakeman, reflect the gendered
understanding of honor that Rousseau articulated. This mode of judicial
reasoning bespeaks a culture that, even as it demanded purity from women,

79.

Bakeman, 18 Wend. at 146, 148. An earlier New York case presages this reasoning. In Jackson
v. Lewis, 13 Johns. 504 (N.Y. 1816), a case involving a real estate transaction, the court

refused to allow the proposed impeachment of a female witness with evidence that she had
been a prostitute in part because "the inquiry as to any particularimmoral conduct is not
admissible against a witness." Id. at 505-06 (emphasis added).
80. Bakeman, 18 Wend. at 153.

81.

Id. at 154. At argument, the appellant had invoked an Islamic rule prohibiting women from
testifying unless the circumstance meant that no male witness could have been present. Id.
at 149. Neither of the two opinions in the case welcomed this attempt to influence the result
by invoking foreign law.

82.

Id.
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privileged a reputation for chastity over actual truth telling, making that
reputation for sexual virtue the pinnacle of female honor. Although Murphy
proved to be an anomaly in Massachusetts, which ultimately adopted a rule
similar to that of New York,8 3 the idea that a woman's unchastity could be used
to impeach her credibility on the witness stand would resonate across the
nation for over a century.
B. Reputation Versus Specific Acts: ProvingImmorality
As is evident from the Bakeman v. Rose majority opinion, courts'
preoccupation with the mechanics of character impeachment further
complicated the analysis of whether a woman's sexual history was relevant to
her honesty. Whether specific act or reputation evidence should be used for
character impeachment 84 is a debate that accounts for much of the ink
expended in nineteenth-century opinions on impeachment. 8, It centered on

whether to allow evidence of "[p]articular acts" to impeach a witness or to
confine the inquiry "to the general character of the witness, or to his general
character for veracity."86 That debate continues today. s
The majority of courts came to prefer reputation evidence. The stated
rationale for this preference was that admitting evidence as to particular facts
would weigh down the trial with time-consuming collateral detail. 8 Dean

83.

See Commonwealth v. Churchill, 52 Mass. (ii Met.) 538, 539 (1846) (citing Bakeman, 18
Wend. 148 (citing New York precedent in adopting "the established rule of the common law
on the subject")).
84. The reputation/specific act dichotomy in the impeachment context differs from and should
not be confused with the issue of the admissibility of pattern evidence as bearing on the
character and propensities of a criminal defendant.
85. See, e.g., Black v. State, 47 S.E. 370, 371 (Ga. 1904) (holding that the credibility of a rape
complainant may be impeached by showing lewdness "only by proof of general bad
character, and not by specific acts").
86. 1 SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRIALS IN ACTIONS CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL § 524, at 449 (Chicago, T.H. Flood & Co. 1889).
87. Compare FED. R. EVID. 6o8(b) (permitting cross-examination on specific instances of
misconduct), with N.J. R. EVID. 6o8 (limiting character impeachment to opinion or
reputation evidence and forbidding the use of specific instances of conduct unless to show
that the witness made a prior false accusation).
88. See, e.g., I THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AND DIGEST
OF PROOFS IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS § 182, at 181 (1837) (arguing that the
reputation rule avoids freighting the trial "with such an accumulated burthen of collateral
proof, that the administration of justice would become impracticable"). Essentially, courts
relied on an efficiency explanation to justify their preference for reputation over specific act
evidence. Wigmore refers to the exclusion of specific act evidence as an "Auxiliary Policy"
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Wigmore, on the other hand, believed that the rule limiting impeachment to
reputation evidence was an American perversion of the earlier English rule that
focused on the personal belief of the impeaching witness grounded in his or
her "personal knowledge" of the person whose credibility was at issue. 8 9
Wigmore cites the phraseology of two prominent evidence treatises as possible
reasons for the shift, but acknowledges that "the exact course of the change is
obscure.""0 This Note offers another explanation."
The debate in American courts over the use of reputation versus specific
acts evidence in the context of efforts to impeach female witnesses with
unchastity evidence suggests why many courts ultimately settled on reputation
as the more desirable mode of proof. For the same reason that the use of
reputation evidence was singularly damaging to female witnesses who were
expected, under the rubric of female honor, to maintain spotless reputations,
judges may have been more receptive to the idea that evidence of reputation
would be a relevant and informative method of impeachment. Thus, the
development of procedural rules in the area of character impeachment may also
be a story informed by the nation's complex view of women and their
credibility.
In seeking to use sexual history to attack a female witness's credibility,
attorneys necessarily engaged the difficult procedural questions surrounding
"bad character" impeachments. 92 And, like the judges in Bakeman, many jurists
responded by focusing on the reputation/specific acts question rather than on
the probative value of sexual history, however proved. 3 The majority

concern rather than a problem with relevance.

2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE,

supra note 3,

§ 979, at 360.
89. 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note

3, §

1982, at 216-19.

go. Id. § 1985, at 224-25.
gi. For another scholarly account of the reputation versus specific act debate in the context of

rape, see Berger, supra note 2, at 17-22. Professor Berger argues that rape was treated
differently in this evidentiary context because of the historic mistrust of rape victims. Id. at
21.

92.
93.

supra note 86, § 522, at 448.
In an early defamation case, for example, the Kentucky court seemed to want to set the
record straight on its impeachment rules when it decided to notice an unappealed error
committed by the plaintiffs lawyer when impeaching a female witness. Evans v. Smith, 21
Ky. 364, 5 T.B. Mon. 237 (1827). At trial, the plaintiffs counsel had asked whether a defense
witness had the reputation of an "unchaste woman" who had "lived with a certain man as
his wife four or five years, without having been married to him." Id. at 366. The court's
concern was not, as a modern reader might assume, that the plaintiffs lawyer had brought
up irrelevant evidence about the woman's personal life. Instead, the judge focused on the
method of impeachment, noting that it had been attempted with reference to "particular
instances of moral turpitude." Id. The case report provides the following summary: "It may
THOMPSON,
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preference for reputation evidence 94 had particular ramifications for female
witnesses, whose honor depended as much on their reputations as their actual
moral integrity. 9 At the same time, those courts may have made what scholars
have labeled a "misguided choice" ' 6 in favor of reputation evidence to prove
character precisely because the question arose so often in the context of female
witnesses and their chastity. Since reputation seemed probative in the context
of female witnesses, courts dealing with character impeachments of women
would have been more inclined to adopt that mode of proof. In other words,
reputation's centrality to female honor may explain both why it was especially
problematic for women to be impeached using what Wigmore referred to as
"the secondhand, irresponsible product of multiplied guesses and gossip that
we call 'reputation' ' 97 and why courts adopted reputation as the proper
method for impeaching character.
The majority opinion in Bakeman underscores the most basic concern with
proof by reputation:
[I]t would be much safer for a female witness to permit the adverse
party to prove the fact that she was a common prostitute, than to
attempt to impeach her credit by showing it by general reputation; as
there would be some chance of refuting the charge, 9if8 it was false, in the
one case, when there would not be any in the other.

be proved against the credit of a witness, that she has the reputation of an unchaste woman,
but not that she does in fact live in a state of concubinage." Id. Thus, not only did it take for
granted the connection between chastity and credibility, the court ignored any special
implications a rule focusing on reputation would have in that context.
94.

See, e.g., BEST, supra note 1, 248, at 290 ("The credibility of a witness is always in issue, and
accordingly general evidence is receivable to show that the character and reputation which
he bears are such that he is unworthy to be believed, even when upon his oath. But evidence
of particularfacts, or particulartransactions, cannot be received for this purpose .... ");
STARKtE, supra note 88, § 182, at 181 ("It is perfectly well settled that the credit of a witness
can be impeached by general evidence only, and not by evidence as to particular facts."). But
Cf. 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE,

supra note 3, S 1985, at 226 ("Just which ... solution[] is the

accepted law of a given jurisdiction to-day is not always easy to say .
9s. See supra Part I.
96. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE

.

§ 43, at 2O (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) (largely

adopting Wigmore's criticism of the reputation rule and arguing that it introduces
speculative evidence that is difficult to disprove).
97.

4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, S 1986, at 232.

98. Bakeman v. Rose, 18 Wend. 146, 147-48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837).
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By arguing that a woman would prefer to refute an actual accusation of
prostitution than to contest her "reputation" for the same, the Bakeman court
offers a powerful condemnation of the latter form of proof.99
The majority's argument against reputation evidence-that it is better to be
accused of something specific, which a witness might then have a chance of
disproving-could apply to all kinds of impeaching testimony, not just that
involving unchastity. Yet courts' preference for reputation evidence is both
more disturbing and more easily explained in cases where the question was a
woman's reputation for sexual virtue. As Rousseau taught, a woman's
reputation for virtue was to be protected as a separate commodity.'° 0 As such,
it became its own measure of truth in a society that thought of a woman's
credibility as measured by her sexual virtue.
Craft v. State, an 1866 Kansas decision, attests to the cultural notion that
notorious unchastity would be worse than private transgressions, particularly
for women. 0 ' At trial, the defendant, who was accused of murder, sought to
exclude or limit the testimony of a female witness on the grounds that she was
a prostitute. The Chief Justice rejected the idea that a prostitute's testimony
should be excluded as a matter of law unless it was corroborated.' 2 He sought
to make his point by analogy to a result he seemed to believe his audience
would find absurd: even outwardly virtuous women would be implicated
under a logic that equated any loss of virtue with untruthfulness. He argued:
A woman's chastity should be the "immediate jewel of her soul," and,
with reference to consequences to herself, the very last virtue she would
be willing to surrender; but when it is considered that she is regarded
as the weaker vessel ... it ought not to be said when, in the warmth of
sexual excitement ... she submits to the embraces of her lascivious
lover, that she pours from her heart at Venus' shrine with her virtue
every other good quality with which, in our thoughts, we endow her
sex. Yet the position assumed must come to that. If, as a matter of law,
her testimony must be rejected when her virtue is lost, the principle will
be the same whether she habitually flaunts her frailty in the face of the

99. The judge may have been freer to make this observation because he viewed any evidence of
unchastity as inadmissible and held that the only inquiry was as to evidence of a general
character for truth and veracity. See supra Section II.A.
1oo. ROUSSEAU, supra note 44, at 325, 328.
1ol. Craft v. State, 3 Kan. 450 (1866).
1o2. Id.; see also infra Section 11.D.
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world, or attempts to hide it in retiracy, or garnish it with garlands of
good works."0 3
While acknowledging the cultural importance of female chastity, the court
clearly felt that a bright line rule connecting chastity with credibility, if taken to
its logical conclusion, would be socially overinclusive by implicating women
who were outwardly chaste.
Almost a half century later in a bleak and contentious statutory rape case
from North Dakota, State v. Apley, the majority opinion still reflected a belief
that a woman's reputation for unchastity was more informative than unchaste
acts themselves. In Apley, however, the court ruled that a woman's reputation
for unchastity was relevant to credibility. A fifteen-year-old girl had accused
her father of raping her when she was twelve. The court held that she could be
asked on cross-examination if she had lived in a brothel because "[i]t bore
upon her general credibility. 1

°4

Although the girl was under the age of

consent, the judge ruled that, indeed, evidence that she had "immoral habits"
would affect her credibility.' 5 In making his point, the judge adduced a
"distinction ... between permitting such cross-examination and the crossexamination upon specific acts of unchastity. ,,6 According to the judge, living
in a "house of prostitution"'0 7 and other such "escapades" "evince[] a degree of
general depravity affecting credibility, while, generally speaking, [specific acts
of intercourse] may not. ',, ° 8 He also cites with approval several treatises to the
effect that "want of chastity must be shown by general reputation and not by
proof of specific acts .
1.0..""9
While this opinion no doubt reflects distaste for
the teen prostitute, it also demonstrates the widely held view that notorious
unchastity differed from private transgressions." 0 Reputation for chastity was

103. Craft, 3 Kan. at 48o.
104. State v. Apley, 141 N.W. 740, 746 (N.D. 1913).
105.

Id.

106. Id. at 747.
107. The court's distinction between what constitutes a specific act and what is a matter of

reputation is not entirely obvious. Id. The judge deemed living in a brothel to be
reputational rather than a specific act, such as a wimess's testimony that he had slept with
the complainant at a specific time or place. Id.
lo8. Apley, 141 N.W. at 747.
iog. Id. at 745 (citing

1o ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EVIDENCE 604

(Edgar W. Camp ed., 1907); 3 SIMON
ed. 1883); 33

GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE S 214, at 203 (14 th
CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 76, at 1479, 148o, 1482).
11o.

Judge Goss's opinion may also show something of a cultural shift from viewing any act of
extramarital sex as a stain on a woman's honor to drawing the line at more extreme acts of
sexual deviance, such as prostitution. Whereas earlier a woman could sully her reputation
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a touchstone of female honor. The prostitute, like the open adulteress or the
loose woman, by her open "depravity" had marred both her chastity and her
reputation.
When focused on women and evidence of perceived sexual promiscuity, the
specific act versus general reputation debate recapitulates Rousseau's
description of reputation as the throne of female honor. The ascendancy of
reputation over truthfulness or even chastity in the calculus of women's honor
meant that a rule excluding facts while allowing reputation evidence about
chastity would be uniquely damaging to a female witness. Because a woman's
reputation was of paramount importance, the fact that she had the reputation
for committing adultery would condemn her without more. It would not
matter if that reputation were deserved or not. Its existence would mean that
the woman was dishonored and therefore untrustworthy. Further, a woman
impeached by such reputation evidence would be perceived as having
committed the dual sin of protecting neither her reputation nor her chastity.
C. Missouri:A Case Study
Beginning in 185o, the Missouri courts produced a series of opinions that
provide a helpful lens for understanding the nineteenth-century case law on
this issue. The Missouri cases are particularly instructive because they arose in
relatively quick succession, generated extensive debate among various jurists in
the state, and grappled explicitly with the question of gender-specific rules for
impeachment with unchastity. 1"' They illustrate how difficult it was for courts
to reject the idea that a woman's chastity might bear on her credibility. At the
same time, when Missouri eventually rejected the rule, it brought itself in line
with a majority of its fellow states, most of which had experienced a
corresponding evolution.
In the first case in this sequence, State v. Shields, the issue was whether a
lower court in an assault and battery trial had improperly excluded a question
about a female witness's "general character for chastity. 12 The court decided

and thereby her honor and credibility with a single indiscreet act, Judge Goss implies that a
woman's reputation would still be tarnished by claims of prostitution but possibly not by
single acts of unchastity. This apparent cultural shift seems to have been arrested at the
boundary of prostitution. See inifra Part III.
m. Missouri cases would also provide useful texts for the study of the influence of race on this
issue. For example, both the case in which Missouri initially admitted evidence of a woman's
unchastity to impeach her, State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113 (1883), and the case in which that
decision was overturned, State v. Williams, 87 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. 1935), involved witnesses
who were black women.
112. State v. Shields, 13 MO. 165, 166 (185o).
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that the question should have been allowed. In doing so, it relied on the
Kentucky Court of Appeals ruling in Evans v. Smith, a defamation case holding
that a woman could be impeached with evidence of her reputation for
unchastity (but not with specific acts)." 3 Even so, the opinion in Shields was
relatively gender-neutral, holding simply that "[a] bad moral character
generally, or a depravity not necessarily allied to a want of truth, may yet to
some extent shake the credibility of a witness, and therefore, is a fair subject of
investigation."" 4
The next case of note, State v. Grant, reached the Missouri Supreme Court
in 1883. The court referred to what had by then become a line of cases dating
back to Evans to hold that a witness could be impeached by general evidence of
moral character. ' Possibly influenced by the nature of the case- a white police
officer had been shot and the main witness for the black male defendant was a
black woman -the court reached back to the long-overruled Murphy decision
in Massachusetts to hold that a female witness's general reputation for having
"descended into ... miscegenous prostitution" would be relevant for
impeachment purposes.6
Until the early 189os, however, Missouri's appellate courts had not
determined whether a man could be impeached with chastity evidence. The
two most likely explanations for this derive from an understanding of the way
in which honor was gendered. Either men were simply not being impeached
(or permitted to be impeached) with evidence regarding their chastity at the
trial court level or such impeachment was not viewed as particularly harmful
and therefore not appealed, or both. The second of three conflicting Missouri
Supreme Court decisions on the impeachment question bears out the latter
possibility." 7 The court in State v. Shroyer held that a male defendant accused of
attempted rape could be impeached with general evidence concerning his
"sobriety and chastity." ' 18 The majority opined that the usual objections to

113.

114.
115.

116.

Evans v. Smith, 21 Ky. 364, 366, 5 T.B. Mon. 237, 238 (1827); see supra text accompanying
note 93.
Shields, 13 Mo. at 166.
Grant,79 Mo. 133. Judge Sherwood cited five cases as authority for the proposition that the
"general moral character or reputation of the witness" could be impeached. Id. (citing State
v. Miller, 71 Mo. 590 (188o); State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380, 386 (1878); State v. Breeden, 58
Mo. 507 (1875); State v. Hamilton, 55 Mo. 520 (1874); Shields, 13 Mo. 165).
Grant, 79 Mo. at 133 (discussing Commonwealth v. Murphy, 14 Mass. 387, 13 Tyng 387
(1817)).

117.

See State v. Sibley, 33 S.W. 167, 168 (Mo. 1895); State v. Shroyer, 16 S.W. 286, 287 (Mo.
1891); Grant, 79 Mo. at 133.

118.

Shroyer, 16 S.W. at 287.
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admitting chastity evidence for men were illogical: "If it be true that the
general character of a man is not affected by his reputation for unchastity, the
evidence of such reputation will do him no injury."" 9 It is not clear why, if it
believed male unchastity to be irrelevant to truth, the court did not go on to
conclude the evidence should have been excluded as irrelevant. If it did not
wish to overturn the verdict, the court could have called this harmless error.
The Supreme Court's oblique opinion in Shroyer left open the question
whether, in fact, Missouri courts would hold the credibility of a man to be
affected by his reputation for unchastity. Prior to Shroyer, the St. Louis Court
of Appeals had twice answered that question in the negative."' Both of these
appellate opinions seem to take for granted a distinction between male and
female honor on the issue of chastity, refusing to allow chastity evidence to
impeach male witnesses."' In one, the court bluntly stated that a man's
reputation for unchastity, in contrast to that of a woman, was not relevant to
his credibility for reasons that were "obvious and need[ed] no comment."'.
Finally, in 1895, in an opinion issued over strenuous dissent, the Missouri
Supreme Court adopted a gender-specific rule. State v. Sibley involved a male
defendant who appealed his conviction for rape on the ground, among others,
that evidence of his sexual proclivities had been improperly admitted.' 3 The
defendant, L.D. Sibley, had been convicted of "defiling, debauching, and
carnally knowing" his stepdaughter Lula Hawkins beginning when she was
between twelve and thirteen years old. Ms. Hawkins testified that she was
repeatedly raped by her stepfather, that when she became pregnant he gave her
medicine that made her hallucinate and vomit, but that the drugs did not
succeed in aborting the fetus. Ms. Hawkins testified that she told her mother
about the rapes, but that her mother took no steps to stop them until she sent
Lula away when she became pregnant.' 4 On the stand, Lula's mother denied
knowledge of any improper relations between her husband and her daughter.
Of the five questions on appeal, the most divisive was whether a man's
reputation for chastity was admissible to impeach his credibility. During the
trial, "[w]itnesses [had been] permitted ... to testify that [Sibley's] general

iig.

Id.

121.

State v. Coffey, 44 Mo. App. 455, 457 (1891); State v. Clawson, 30 Mo. App. 139,144 (1888).
Coffey, 44 Mo. App. at 457; Clawson, 30 Mo. App. at 144.

122.

Clawson, 30 Mo. App. at 144.

123.

State v. Sibley, 33 S.W. 167 (Mo. 1895).

120.

124.

Id. at 168; see also Scheppele, supra note 2 (discussing how women like Lula Hawkins likely
faced other embedded legal obstacles in their rape trials, such as biases against women who
delayed reporting their rapes or who failed to confide in others after being raped).
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character for chastity and virtue was bad.' ' 2s On appeal, the Sibley majority
held that this testimony was irrelevant and harmful. After acknowledging a
conflict in recent Missouri precedent, the majority reasoned, "It is a matter of
common knowledge that the bad character of a man for chastity does not even
in the remotest degree affect his character for truth, when based upon that
alone, while it does that of a woman.''126 The court's explanation for such a
stark divide in the markers of male and female honesty recalls the central role
chastity played in determining a woman's reputation relative to that of a man:
It is no compliment to a woman to measure her character for truth by
the same standard that you do that of a man's predicated upon
character for chastity. What destroys the standing of the one in all the
walks of life has no effect whatever on the standing for truth of the
other. Thus ...it is said: "Adultery has been committed openly by
distinguished and otherwise honorable members [of the bar] as well in
Great Britain as in our own country, yet the offending party has not
been supposed to destroy the force of the obligation which they feel
from the oath of office." Dr. Johnson said, in discussing the difference
of turpitude between lewdness in a man and in a woman, "that he
would not receive back a daughter because her husband, in the mere
wantonness of appetite, had gone into the servant girl." And so
McCaulay said, respecting the weakness of Lord Byron for sexual
pleasure, "that it was an infirmity he shared with many great and noble
'
men,-Lord Somers, Charles James Fox, and others."127
While bereft of any attempt to reason through the different treatment of male
and female "wantonness," the majority opinion exposes the dual nature of
honor and its relation to truthfulness. An "honorable" man could commit
adultery without harming his reputation for truthfulness, but a woman's
honor, and thereby her credibility, were damaged when she was accused of
lewdness.
The dissent points out the fallacy, if not the cultural falsity, of the theory
advanced by the majority with its list of unchaste and prominent men. If a
prostitute has "so impaired her moral sense that the obligation to speak the

125.

126.

127.

Sibley, 33 S.W. at

170.

Id. at 171. With this quote, Judge Burgess assured his place in legal history. Feminist
scholars have quoted it repeatedly as an example of the law's sexism. See, e.g., Michelle J.
Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape
Shield Law, 7o GEO.WASH. L. REv. 51, 75 (2002); Galvin, supra note 8, at 787 n.1i6.
Sibley, 33 S.W. at 171.
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truth is no longer binding," the dissent asks, why is the same not true of her
customers?128 Why would a man's "disregard of the laws of chastity" not
equally tend to prove a "disposition to lightly regard the obligations of his
oath?" '29 Although unable to rebut the principal strength of the majority
position-its cultural accuracy-the dissent's logical reasoning ultimately did
prove itself more powerful in courts across the country.
In 1935, Missouri abandoned the rule admitting evidence of a witness's
"bad reputation for morality" that had allowed women to be impeached with
evidence of their unchastity.' 3° In State v. Williams, the Missouri Supreme
Court ruled that it was error to impeach a woman accused of killing her
husband with evidence "that her general reputation in the community for
morality ...was bad."1 3' The court recognized the prejudicial nature of such
impeaching evidence, particularly for a defendant, "[fWor a bad reputation for
morality imports moral turpitude."'32 Instead, it held "the impeaching
testimony should be confined to the real and ultimate object of the inquiry,
133
which is the reputation of the witness for truth and veracity."
Although coming to this conclusion later than many, Missouri's decision in
Williams aligned it with a majority of jurisdictions banning the use of various
forms of so-called morality evidence to impeach a witness. As evidenced much
earlier in New York and then Massachusetts, 3 4 these courts determined that a
reputation for truth and veracity was the sine qua non of honesty and formed
the only relevant inquiry when impeaching a witness. By 1935, according to the
court in Williams, "[i]n twenty-two states the impeachment evidence is
confined to the reputation of the witness for truth and veracity.' 3 Further, in

128.

Id. at 172 (Gantt, J.,
dissenting in part).

129.

131.

Id.
State v. Williams, 87 S.W.2d 175, 181 (Mo. 1935).
Id. at 18o.

132.

Id. at 181.

133.

Id. at 182.

134.

See supra Section II.A.
Williams, 87 S.W.2d at 183. The majority lists the following states as confining
impeachment to the witness's reputation for truth and veracity: Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. at 183 n.5. The Missouri
court also cited the Wigmore, Jones, and Greenleaf treatises as support for its holding. Id. at
183. The relevant section of Wigmore's treatise states: "In the United States, only veracitycharacter [evidence] is admissible, in the great majority of jurisdictions." 2 WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 923, at 304.

130.

13S.
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those jurisdictions still allowing evidence of bad general character, many courts
maintained that "the line be drawn at bad general character, and that no specific
quality other than that of veracity be considered."" 6
D. Rationality's Triumph, or Merely a Transformation?
To the extent that courts eventually eliminated the general use of morality
evidence to impeach a witness, the debate over chastity and credibility
represents something of a success story for the Enlightenment rationality
espoused by early jurists. 37' Although scholars have pointed out that
concomitant problems arise from an evidence system that privileges "fact over
value, reason over emotion ... and perception over intuition, '' ,,8 in this
instance that very concern with the "science of proof,"' 3 9 as Wigmore calls it,
seems to have allowed the judiciary to overcome a prejudice still present in the
culture. In Williams, for example, Judge Ellison wrote that "reason" favored
admitting only evidence of truth and veracity; to make that point, he went on
to identify the rationales for such a rule. 4 ' In Craft, the Kansas case refusing to

136. 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE,
137.

138.

139.

140.

supra note 3, S 924, at 309.

"Enlightenment rationality" refers to attempts by courts to rely on logic, reason, and
scientific precepts to decide issues that cultural norms might distort. For a feminist critique
of this "rationalist tradition," see Donald Nicolson, Gender, Epistemology and Ethics: Feminist
Perspectives on Evidence Theory, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON EVIDENCE 13 (Mary Childs &
Louise Ellison eds., 2000).
Hunter, supra note 13, at 129. Professor Hunter argues that the evidence laws impart greater
value to stereotypically "masculine" attributes such as reason to the detriment of those, such
as sexual assault victims, who are, by virtue of their particular victimization, necessarily
perceived as stereotypically "feminine." Id. at 13o; see also Nicolson, supra note 137 (arguing
that mainstream evidence scholarship has a masculine bias).
JOHN H. WIGMORE, A STUDENTS' TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 12 (1935). This is not
to suggest that Wigmore's "science" actually succeeded in being unaffected by cultural bias.
See, e.g., Leigh B. Bienen, A Question of Credibility: John Henry Wigmore's Use of Scientific
Authority in Section 924a of the Treatise on Evidence, 19 CAL. W. L. REV. 235, 236 (1983).
Williams, 87 S.W.2d. at 183. Judge Ellison's reasons were:
(i) [t]hat it reaches directly the fundamental object of the inquiry; (2) that a
general bad reputation for morality does not always necessarily import a lack of
veracity; (3) that the conclusions of an ordinary impeaching witness on such a
question are apt to be drawn inexactly from uncertain data, or to rest on personal
prejudice or honest differences of opinion on points of belief or conduct; (4) that
impeachment by methods so loose and inconclusive often.., introduces collateral
issues; (5) and that while witnesses may be directly discredited by proof of former
convictions, or admissions of fact involving moral turpitude, still they ought not
to be subjected to impeachment by indefinite hearsay, i. e. [sic] by proof of bad
repute for morality.
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automatically exclude the evidence of a prostitute, the Chief Justice explained
that "[t]he law is certainly not so unreasonable."14 ' And as early as 1835, Chief
Justice Gibson had used a similar argument to make Pennsylvania one of the
first states to clearly ban evidence of prostitution to impeach the credibility of a
female witness. 142 Refusing even to acknowledge the possibility that her
chastity might bear directly on a woman's veracity, Chief Justice Gibson wrote:
"If character for veracity be the legitimate point of inquiry, and if to this
that it is the only one, and that an
complexion it must come at last, it follows
43
inquiry into anything else is illegitimate.'
Whether influenced by the rule of law and its attendant demand for
relevant, logically probative evidence, by better information, or by some degree
of cultural change, courts in early twentieth century cases regularly excluded
sexual history evidence as a method of impeachment. In 1913, a North Dakota
opinion marshaled over eighty cases to support the proposition that evidence
of "moral character," or specifically chastity evidence, "should not be admitted
for the purpose alone of impeachment."'" Significantly, however, this opinion
was written in dissent from State v. Apley, the statutory rape case. The
dissenters wished to "protest against [the] adoption" of a rule allowing a
woman to be impeached with chastity evidence. Thus, despite those eightyodd cases, the serpentine grip of chastity on a woman's credibility had yet to be
fully disengaged. 141 And although the Apley dissent argues courageously against
the majority's decision, it also points to the new frontier for women's honor:
the use of chastity evidence to prove consent in sexual assault cases. For at the
same time that Apley's dissent condemned the "admissibility of the testimony
as to the girl's prior chastity to the sole purpose of affecting her credibility," it
explicitly left open the question whether such evidence would be relevant to
prove consent.1

6

Id.
141.
142.

143.

Craft v.State, 3 Kan. 450, 4 81 (1866); see supra Section ll.B.
Gilchrist v. McKee, 4 Watts 380, 381 (Pa. 1835). Gilchristwas a suit over money resulting
from a real estate transaction in which a woman, Mary Ford, was called as a witness for the
plaintiff and the defendant proposed to give evidence of her general character for chastity.
Id. at 38o.
Id. at 381; see also Morse v. Pineo, 4 Vt. 281, 283 (1832) ("There is no way to ascertain, how
far the reputation of a prostitute affects her truth, but by proving her character for truth.").

144. State v. Apley, 141 N.W. 740, 754 (N.D. 1913) (Burke, J., dissenting); see also supra Section

II.B.
145.
146.

Id. at 755.
Id. at 754-55. Because it was a statutory rape case, consent was not directly at issue in Apley.
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III. GENDERED HONOR: MODERN EVIDENCE

A. Proving Consent: GenderedHonorRetouched
Even as these early cases ultimately seemed to reject a gendered vision of
honor, the portrait was actually being retouched. Logic had taught that
although lawyers almost invariably sought to influence juries by impeaching a
female witness's credibility with chastity evidence, this type of questioning
could not reasonably be permitted in a court of law. Yet, the same courts that
denied the link between unchastity and credibility when a female witness
testified in a case not involving her own honor often abandoned that logic
when the witness was a woman bringing a rape accusation. 147 In sexual assault
trials, many judges meticulously noted that evidence of the victim's sexual
history was entirely relevant on the question of consent even though it would
not be relevant on the question of credibility. 14 They did not explain exactly
how, particularly in light of the history of such impeachment, unchastity
evidence could speak to consent without at the same time shaping the jury's
view of the victim's credibility. Further, by a definition of rape as
nonconsensual sex,' 49 evidence intended to prove consent would also implicate
credibility.'5

147.

Courts often justified the use of unchastity evidence in rape trials technically as a form of
character or propensity evidence. This usage itself represented an exception to the general
rule that character or propensity evidence is inadmissible as substantive evidence to prove
that the person acted in conformity with the character trait. See Galvin, supra note 8, at 77778. Professor Galvin provides a detailed and lucid explanation of this and other evidentiary
biases that led to the rape shield laws and other rape law reforms in the early 197os. She
explains that at common law, evidence of the victim's character was admissible in only two
types of cases: homicide cases in which the defendant claimed self-defense and rape cases in
which the defendant claimed consent. Id. at 78-83. In the prototypical self-defense case, the
defendant claims that the victim was the aggressor and offers the character evidence to show
that the victim was a violent person and that he acted violently again. In the prototypical
rape case, the defendant says that the complainant agreed to sexual activity and offers the
chastity evidence to show that she "had a propensity to engage in nonmarital sexual
activity." Id. at 783.

148. See, e.g., Maxey v. State, 52 S.W.2d 2, 6 (Ark. 1899) (noting that the victim's reputation for a
lack of chastity or the fact of prostitution is material on the issue of consent); People v.
Gray, 96 N.E. 268, 273 (Ill.
1911) (noting that a reputation for chastity was only admissible
on the question of consent, although not in a statutory rape case); Harris v. Neal, 116 N.W.
535, 536 (Mich. 19o8) (noting that proof of a reputation for unchastity is admissible in a
criminal trial on the question of consent). But see State v. Rivers, 74 A. 757, 759 (Conn.
19o9) (holding acts of unchastity admissible to discredit a witness in a rape case).
149. Early definitions of rape focused on nonconsent as "the essence of rape." Berger, supra note
2, at 8. Berger cites Lord Coke's definition of rape as "unlawful and carnal knowledge and
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Not surprisingly, then, courts invariably touched upon credibility as they
attempted to explain why unchastity evidence should be admissible in rape
trials even though it could not be used to impeach credibility in other types of
cases. For example, in an 189o Maryland case, Brown v. State, the court

identified cases of rape as a "well-recognized exception" to the "general rule"
that "the character for veracity of a female witness cannot ... be impeached by

evidence as to her character for chastity." ' 1 In rape cases, the court observed,
the general character of the prosecutrix for chastity is always admissible "for
obvious reasons.""5 2 While acknowledging that a rape could conceivably be
committed "even upon a lewd... woman," the court nevertheless felt that her
lewdness "may have a material bearing upon the question whether the act was
committed with or against her consent." ' Here the court seemed to
understand chastity evidence as bearing both on consent and credibility.
Although the court agreed that chastity is not ordinarily a predictor of
credibility, in an echo of that disavowed logic, the court saw rape as a

abuse of any woman above the age of ten years against her will." Id. at 3 n.8 (quoting
EDWARD

COKE,

THE THIRD PART

OF THE INSTITUTES

OF THE LAWS

OF ENGLAND

CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 60
(photo. reprint 1979) (1628)). In many jurisdictions, an additional emphasis on force or

resistance later crept into this definition, although it was often understood as probative of
consent. Id. (citing Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 356, 359 (1872) ("As a practical matter, the
state will usually offer proof of force (or threats) as well as absence of consent since the
former bears so directly on the latter.")). Although the force requirement imposed a "special
burden of opposition" in some jurisdictions, Berger, supra note 2, at 8, "female nonconsent"
generally remained the "rubric under which all of the issues in a close case [were] addressed
and resolved." ESTRICH, supra note lo, at 29.
15o. Katherine Baker has framed this link between a woman's sexual history and her credibility
in terms of "juror disregard" rather than "juror disbelief." Katharine K. Baker, Once A
Rapist? MotivationalEvidence and Relevancy in Rape Law, io HARv. L. REV. 563, 589 (1997).
In other words, "[i]f a woman breaches [very rigid norms of appropriate sexual conduct],
her credibility becomes largely irrelevant because the jury will not bother to vindicate her
violation." Id. This modern articulation of the problem with admitting sexual history
evidence helps articulate the fallacy in trying to parse the question of consent from other
issues influencing the jury. To try to separate jurors' disregard of a woman's plight from
their disbelief, however, seems equally fallacious. If we understand a woman's honor and by
extension her credibility and her very integrity as a person to be implicated by any breach of
sexual norms, then juror disregard in the face of such information is the natural product of
the disbelief that comes with a woman's sullied honor. Whether jury members think a
woman is incapable of being raped or evince a pure skepticism about her lack of consent, at
root they disbelieve her statement that she has, in fact, been violated based on the
implications they derive from her sexual past.
151. 20

152.

Id.

153.

Id.

A. 186, 188 (Md. 189o).
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between chastity and truth was

The statutory rape case from North Dakota, State v. Apley, suggests even
more strongly that in rape cases unchastity evidence functioned primarily to
interrogate the victim's credibility.' s Because it was a statutory rape case,
credibility, not consent, was the issue, and the defendant offered sexual history
evidence to impeach the victim's testimony. The majority, which ruled in favor
of admitting the evidence, seemed unconcerned with the precise boundaries
between consent and credibility. In contrast, the dissent argued that if
unchastity evidence were admissible at all, it would be admissible only to prove
consent, not to undermine credibility. To defend its position, the majority cited
treatises by Wigmore and Greenleaf,' s6 two encyclopedias of evidence,5 7 and a
long list of cases purporting to hold that "want of chastity may be shown as
affecting credibility of the prosecutrix as a witness.',, 8 The dissent
painstakingly reviewed much of the same law to show that unchastity evidence,
if admissible at all, could only be introduced to show consent or some material
fact other than credibility.' s9 Although both sides marshaled an impressive
array of sources, the sources themselves were replete with ambiguity. While in
seeming agreement that chastity evidence was relevant in a rape trial, the
treatises did not consistently identify consent as the rationale.
Professor Greenleafs treatise on evidence demonstrates just how little
guidance courts received from such compilations. In the section titled "Facts
not affecting credibility," the treatise states:
There is another class of questions ... the answers to which, though
they may disgrace the witness in other respects, yet will not affect the
credit due to his testimony.... Such are the questions frequently

154.

155.

Cf. State v. Clawson, 30 Mo. App. 139 (Ct. App. 1888) ("The reason for the distinction [in
allowing testimony about a woman's chastity and not a man's] is obvious and needs no
comment.").
141 N.W. 740 (N.D. 1913); see supra Section II.B.

156. 141 N.W. at 745

(citing

GREENLEAF, supra note 19o, § 214, at 203; 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE,

supra note 3, § 200, at 245).
1S7.

Id. (citing 33 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 76, at 1479-82; 1o THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EVIDENCE (Edward W. Camp ed., 1907)).

158. Apley, 141 N.W. at 745.

1S9. Id. at 748-55.

1888

UNCHASTE AND INCREDIBLE

in trials for
attempted to be put to the principal female16 witness,
°
&c.
rape,
for
indictments
on
and
,
...
seduction
Yet, in the section titled, "Character of prosecutrix," the treatise advised
that "[t]he characterof the prosecutrixforchastity may also be impeached, '1 61 the
only caveat being that it "must be done by general evidence of her reputation ' in
6
that respect, and not by evidence of particular instances of unchastity. ,1 2
Ironically, Francis Wharton's treatise on criminal law, another treatise cited by
the majority in Apley, ' 6' does identify the purpose of impeaching a rape victim
with her sexual history as consent, not credibility:
At common law and under statute, in the absence of a specific provision
to the contrary, the chastity or want of chastity on the part of the female
is immaterial in the commission, or the charge of the commission, of
the crime of rape; for carnal knowledge of a woman, without her
consent and against her will, constitutes rape where she is lewd and
immoral or unchaste, just the same as though she were of the most
spotless purity and virtue; but on accusation of the commission of the
offense against a woman of unchaste or immoral character, her want of
chastity may be shown as bearing on the question of consent to the
act.164

It seems counterintuitive that the majority in Apley, as it defended the
admission of sexual history evidence in a statutory rape case, would cite to
language from Wharton that explicitly excludes evidence of sexual history
unless consent is at issue. Yet the majority seems indifferent to the point.
People v. Abbot, an early New York case relied upon by the Apley majority,
shows that, even in a nonstautory rape case, unchastity evidence functioned to
undermine the victim's credibility.16 s Abbot involved a rape prosecution on
behalf of a woman who had been a servant in the house of the married
defendant, a clergyman. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that
he should have been permitted to ask the victim "whether she had not had

160. 1 GREENLEAF,
161. 3 id.

§

supra note

109,

§ 458, at 555.

214, at 203.

162. Id.; see

also supra Section II.B.

163. Apley, 141 N.W. at 745.
164. 1 FRANcIs WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAw

§ 695, at 864-65 (iith ed.

1912)

(citations omitted).
165. People v. Abbot, 19 Wend.

192

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
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previous criminal connection with other men.' 66 The court reversed. Only one
year after the Court of Errors had held, in Bakeman v. Rose, 67 that prostitution
evidence was inadmissible to impeach general credibility, the Abbot court
articulated a seemingly contradictory position: "Without expressing an opinion
whether it may commonly be used even as an item in the estimate of general
credibility, I do not feel clear that it should be repudiated in respect to the
68
prosecutrix, where the trial is for rape.",1
The majority in Apley cited Abbot for the proposition that a female rape
6
victim's credibility could be impeached by showing her to be a prostitute., ,
And, indeed, this is one way of interpreting the above language. The Abbot
opinion proceeds, however, to try to distinguish evidence bearing on consent
from that bearing on credibility. In concluding that this instance of specific act
impeachment was proper, the court argued for its relevance to consent:
In such a case the material issue is on the willingness or reluctance of
the prosecutrix-an act of mind. These offences ... are in their very
nature committed under circumstances of the utmost privacy. The
prosecutrix is usually, as here, the sole witness to the principal facts,
and the accused is put to rely for his defence on circumstantial evidence.
Any fact tending to the inference that there was not the utmost
reluctance and the utmost resistance, is always received .... [A] re we to
be told that previous prostitution shall not make one among those
circumstances which raise a doubt of assent? ... And how is the latter
case to be made out? How more directly ... than by an examination of
170
the prosecutrix herself?
The court went on to claim that precedents such as Bakeman mistakenly
supposed that unchastity testimony was designed to "shake the general
credibility of the witness, as if it went to truth and veracity." 17' To the contrary,
the court insisted that "it goes to her credibility in the particular matter, to a
circumstance relevant to the case in hand, from which the jury are asked to say
she did consent."' 72 We need look no further than Apley for confirmation that,

166. Id. at 194.

167. 18 Wend. 146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837); see also supra Sections II.A-B.
168. Abbot, 19 Wend. at 197-98.
169. Apley, 141 N.W. at 746.
170.

Abbot, 19 Wend. at 194-95.

iii.

Id. at 197.

172.

Id.
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despite these efforts, the Abbot majority did not succeed in convincingly
refraining credibility as consent.
If the idea that a rape victim's credibility was bound up in her sexual
history is a direct descendant (if not a sibling) of the equation between female
honor and chastity, why were courts able to understand the irrelevance of
chastity evidence except in the case of rape? In addition to the answers already
developed in scholarship discussing rape's distinctive treatment among
crimes, ' 7 another lies in the courts' own explanation: in the rape trial, such
evidence could be admitted on another ground, namely consent. 174
Consent, a question that, as we have seen, necessarily encompasses the
issue of credibility in a rape trial, became the way station of women's honor,
the place where a woman's credibility would continue to be judged by her

173.Susan Brownmiller articulated one of the most influential theories on the reasons behind
American culture's treatment of rape. She explained,
The real reason for the law's everlasting confusion as to what constitutes an act of
rape and what constitutes an act of mutual intercourse is the underlying cultural
assumption that it is the natural masculine role to proceed aggressively toward
the stated goal, while the natural feminine role is to "resist" or "submit."
BROWNMILLER, supra note 2, at 432. Note that Ronald J. Berger, Patricia Searles & W.
Lawrence Neuman, Rape-Law Reform: Its Nature, Origins, and Impact, in RAPE & SOCIETY:
READINGS ON THE PROBLEM OF SExuAL ASSAULT 223

174.

(Patricia Searles & Ronald J. Berger eds.,

1995) provides a brief, but useful overview of the scholarship on genesis of the various rape
biases in the law. Those explanations include: that "rape law regulated women's sexuality
and protected male rights to possess women as sexual objects," "sociolegal conceptions of
women as the property of males," "concern that women would deliberately lie about rape in
order 'to explain premarital intercourse, infidelity, pregnancy, or disease, or to retaliate
against an ex-lover or some other man,"' id. at 224 (quoting C. SPOHN &J. HORNEY, RAPE
LAw REFORM: A GRASS ROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 24 (1992)), and the idea that
"when a woman married she impliedly and irrevocably consented to the sexual advances of
her husband," id.
Courts often expressed real concerns about protecting the rights of defendants when
explaining the admission of sexual history evidence. For example, a 19o9 Connecticut
opinion invokes the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when explaining why sexual
history evidence would be admissible in a statutory rape case:
[Rape is a crime] of the gravest character. Its punishment may by statute be
imprisonment in the state prison for 30 years. From the nature of the offense
charged, the testimony of the female who claims to have been assaulted is
generally the principal, and may be the only, evidence that the crime has been
committed. In a case of this character a broad latitude of cross-examination
should be allowed the accused in order to test the veracity of such a witness.
State v. Rivers, 74 A. 757, 759 (Conn. 19o9). These concerns are weighty, but, as rape law
reformers pointed out in their bid to have such evidence excluded, they are not met by the
use of sexual history evidence to impeach victim credibility or to prove conduct in
conformity with a character for promiscuity on the part of the victim.
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chastity and her reputation.1 7s As time went on, courts increasingly accepted
the relevance of unchastity as a given that required no reasoned rationale.
Judge Riley's opinion for the West Virginia Supreme Court in a 1953 case is
illustrative. 17 6 After finding that the victim's sexual history was "admissible to
show that she probably gave her consent to the alleged intercourse," the judge
goes on to recommend readers to Wigmore "[f]or a detailed and scholarly
discussion of the question" of the admissibility of such evidence in a
prosecution for rape.1 77 In fact, many courts seem to have relied on Wigmore or
penal codes based on his teachings as a substitute for reasoned explanation of
the rule.'

78

When courts did attempt to explain the relevance of unchastity evidence in
rape trials, their explanations inevitably returned to credibility. In yet another
Brown v. State, this time a 1953 Alabama rape case, the court provided this
description of the dual function of sexual history evidence:
This rule is based on the theory that a person of bad moral character is
less likely to speak the truth as a witness than one of good moral

175.

Rape law continues to be plagued by double standards. Federal Rule of Evidence 413, which
became effective in 1995, "singles out sexual assault as the only crime to which the general
prior act rule [excluding evidence of prior bad acts to prove a propensity of the defendant to
act in conformity therewith] does not apply," Baker, supra note 15o, at 569. Ironically,
"enhancing victim credibility" was a major rationale given by proponents of the additional
evidentiary rule. Id. at 583.

176. State v. Franklin, 79 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1953).
177.

Id. at 704. Wigmore's views on women and the "psychology" suggesting that they often
invent complaints of sexual outrage, 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLOAMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §

924(a), at 736-47 (rev. ed.

1970), are beyond the scope of this paper and have been deservedly and thoroughly
discredited. See, e.g., Bienen, supra note 139.
178.

See, e.g., Caldwell v. State, 349 A.2d 623, 625-26 (Md. 1976) (citing 1 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAw § 62, at 464-67 (3d ed. 1940)) ("[T]he character of a rape-complainant for

chastity or the lack thereof has, in a majority of common law jurisdictions, been held
admissible as tending to show that the act of intercourse, if committed at all, was with the
consent of the prosecutrix."); State v. Steele, 224 A.2d 132, 135 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1966) (citing I WIGMORE, supra, § 62, at 464-67) ("[C]ross-examination upon proper
foundation has been permitted with respect to the complaining witness's general reputation
for chastity, or lack of it, as bearing on the issue of consent in a rape case."); Commonwealth
v. Dulacy, 205 A.2d 706, 708 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1964) ("A distinguished text writer has said
that ... 'the character of the woman as to chastity is of considerable probative value in
judging the likelihood of... consent .. "' (citing I WIGMORE, supra, § 62, at 464-67)).
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character, and that a woman who is chaste will be less likely to consent
179
to an illicit connection, than one who is unchaste.
The court, perhaps sensing that a rule that unchastity is relevant to consent
cannot be defended on the mere assertion that chaste women consent less,
unwittingly grounded its rationale on our old friend credibility. Although
courts and treatise writers had banished the trappings of gender-specific honor
from ordinary impeachment,"' in rape trials, unchastity and reputation were
still closely allied as substantive markers of female truth.
B. Moral Turpitude, Honor, and the Prostitute

Rape shield laws substantially limited the types of sexual history evidence
that could be introduced, 8 ' usually by excluding evidence of the complainant's
sexual history unless with the defendant. Nonetheless, certain perceived
offenses against sexual morality still recall the link between female honor and
sexual purity. One of those offenses is prostitution. It stands as a remnant of a
seemingly antiquated moral code, particularly to the extent that it is still a
crime and one that most often targets female offenders. 8 2 Prostitution is also

still overtly linked to untruthfulness in many states through the idea that a
prior prostitution conviction can be used to impeach the credibility of a
witness.' Although most states have adopted language from the Uniform

179. Brown v. State, 280 So. 2d 177, 179 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973).
iso. See supra Section II.D; supra note 135.
181.See generally Anderson, supra note 126 (arguing that the "chastity requirement" in rape law

182.

that conditioned the vindication of a rape complainant on her sexual virtue persists,
particularly in acquaintance rape cases and cases where the defense is mistaken consent);
Marah deMeule, PrivacyProtectionsfor the Rape Complainant:Halfa FigLeaf,8o N.D. L. REV.
145 (2004) (arguing that the privacy concerns the rape shield laws sought to address are
being overlooked outside the courtroom).
See, e.g., Beverly Balos, Teaching Prostitution Seriously, 4 BUFF. CIM. L. REV.709, 721 (2001)
("Statistics show women in prostitution are arrested and prosecuted at far higher rates than
the men who 'patronize' them."); Julie Lefler, Shining the Spotlight on Johns: Moving Toward
Equal Treatment of Male Customers and Female Prostitutes, lo HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 11, 17
(1999) ("[Slome states preserve America's historical inequitable treatment of prostitutes
and johns.... For example, Kentucky law ... specifically states that a man cannot be

convicted of prostitution, and does not provide penalties for patronizing a prostitute ....
").
183.

See, e.g., FED.R. EVID. 6o9(a)(2) (allowing admission of evidence of a criminal conviction to
impeach credibility if "the elements of the crime required proof or admission of an act of
dishonesty or false statement by the witness"). Since 1974, the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
rules recommended to the states by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
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Code of Evidence limiting the use of prior convictions for impeachment to
convictions of a crime punishable by more than a year in prison (generally a
felony), or of a crime involving "dishonesty," these limitations have not always
prevented courts from admitting evidence of prostitution convictions. 8 4 Some
states are still amenable to arguments that prostitution is a crime involving
"dishonesty.' 8' Still others adhere to the common law idea that a witness can
be impeached with evidence of a crime involving "moral turpitude. ' 18 6 Not
surprisingly, in jurisdictions employing the term "moral turpitude,"
prostitution is generally held to be such a crime.' 8' In this way, the law once
again links unchastity, now in the form of prostitution, with untruthfulness.
In nineteenth- and early twentieth-century cases, it is difficult to
distinguish prostitution from adultery, cohabitation, or a plethora of other
lapses of female virtue. While not overly fond of prostitutes, judges in early
cases seemed not to differentiate them greatly from other offenders against

State Laws, have conformed to the Federal Rules in form and number. PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, at vi ( 3d ed. 2007).
184. See Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutionsof Violence Against Women, 36
IND. L. REv. 687, 691-92 (2003) ("Twenty-five states have adopted FRE 6o9(a) virtually
verbatim, and these states allow impeachment with either felonies or misdemeanors
involving dishonesty. Thirteen other states have adopted statutes that permit impeachment
with convictions but do not limit these convictions to the categories set forth in FRE 6o9(a)
....
" (citations omitted)).
185. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 518 A.2d 446 (D.C. 1986) (finding that evidence of a
conviction for prostitution is not excluded by the rule excluding evidence of a prior crime
unless it involves "dishonesty" or "false statement").
186.

187.

125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 896, 902 (Ct. App. 2002) (articulating the
evidence standard in California that conduct involving "moral turpitude" is relevant to a
witness's credibility); see also People v. Castro, 696 P.2d in1, 118 (Cal. 1985) (defining "moral
turpitude" as involving the general "readiness to do evil" (quoting Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R.,
137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884))); Sara M. Walsh, Krista Eckhardt & Steve Russell, Sex, Lies, and
Law: Moral Turpitude as an Enforcer of Gender and Sexuality Norms, SEXUALITY RES. & SOC.
POL'Y, June 2006, at 37 (suggesting that turpitude law is a legal link between sexual conduct
and dishonesty and providing several specific examples of that link).

See, e.g., People v. Feaster,

See, e.g., People v. Chandler, 6S Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 691 (Ct. App. 1997) (discussing
California's rule); see also Lininger, supra note 184, at 692; Nate Carter, Comment, Shocking
the Conscience of Mankind: Using International Law To Define "Crimes Involving Moral
Turpitude" in Immigration Law, lo LEwis & CLAK L. REv. 955 (2006) (discussing the lack of
adequate objective criteria for determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude in the
context of immigration law); Karin S. Portlock, Note, Status on Trial: The Racial
Ramifications of Admitting Prostitution Evidence Under State Rape Shield Legislation, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 14o6 (2007) ("[P]rostitution evidence is admitted in some
jurisdictions to impeach the witness because prostitution is considered a crime of 'moral
turpitude' at common law.").
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norms of female chastity.'8 8 Courts seemed to view prostitution as one smudge
on the spectrum of female dishonor. At times, in fact, early cases seem
particularly unbiased toward prostitutes, as in the 1846 case in which
Massachusetts overruled its previous decisions to bar the use of evidence that a
female witness was a prostitute to impeach her credibility.

9

Recent developments in Massachusetts and elsewhere in the country,
however, reveal a changed role for prostitution in the calculus of female
honor.' 9° For example, the District of Columbia has espoused the view that a
witness's credibility is linked to her identity as a prostitute despite the seeming
restraints of modern evidence rules."' 1 In Brown v. United States, the
government impeached a woman who was defending an assault charge with
her two prior convictions for soliciting prostitution. 92 On appeal, the court
rejected her argument that "such convictions do not involve 'dishonesty or false
statement' as required under the District of Columbia code. 93 The court
ruled, inscrutably, that the terms "dishonesty" and "false statement" were
merely meant to exclude the use of offenses "involving passion and short
temper, such as simple assault. 19 4 Crimes such as soliciting prostitution,
however, were judged to bear on the question of honesty. Likewise, California
courts have ruled that prostitution is a crime of moral turpitude and that, even

188. See, e.g., Rau v. State, 1O5 A. 867 (Md. 1919) (holding that veracity may not be attacked by
proving bad character for chastity or prostitution); Commonwealth v. Churchill, 52 Mass.
(ii Met.) 538 (1846) (holding that evidence that a female witness is a prostitute is no longer
admissible to impeach credibility); Bakeman v. Rose, 18 Wend. 146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837)
(holding that a female witness cannot be impeached with evidence of prostitution.); Jackson
v. Lewis, 13 Johns. 503 (N.Y. 1816) (holding that a female witness cannot be impeached with
evidence that she had been a common prostitute); Spears v. Forrest, 15 Vt. 435 (1843)

(holding that evidence of prostitution is not admissible to impeach the character of a
witness).
i89. Churchill, 52 Mass. (ii Met.) 538.
19o. See Chandler, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 69o-91; Brown, 518 A.2d 446; Commonwealth v. Harris,
825 N.E.2d 58 (Mass. 2005).

191. Brown, 518 A.2d 446.The provision at issue, D.C. CODE § 14-305 (1981), states:
for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness
has been convicted of a criminal offense shall be admitted if offered, but only if
the criminal offense (A) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (B) involved dishonesty
or false statement (regardless of punishment).
This provision is modeled on Rule 6o9(a)(2) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.
192. Brown, 518 A.2d at 446.
193.

Id. at 447.

194.

Id.
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without a conviction, evidence the victim participated in prostitution is
admissible for impeachment purposes.19
Nowhere is the modern attitude toward prostitution evidence more
striking than in Massachusetts, a state that first rejected impeachment of a
witness's credibility with evidence of prostitution in 1846.96 In 2005, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court heard Richard Harris's appeal of his rape
conviction.1 97 The original crime had many elements of the stranger rapes that
studies have shown are least likely to breed skepticism in judges and juries'98:
the victim had never met the alleged rapist, she was dragged into a stairway
where she was allegedly raped, witnesses saw her run screaming back to the bar
as soon as she could break free, and she immediately told the bartender she had
been raped. 9 9 The victim, however, had previously been convicted of
"Nightwalking."2 ° Mr. Harris's defense was that the sex was a consensual
transaction."' Accordingly, one of the issues on appeal was his contention that
the trial judge had "discretion to admit evidence of a complaining witness's
conviction of a prior sexual offense for purposes of impeaching that
witness." ' Although the Massachusetts rape shield statute prohibited
evidence of a sexual assault victim's "sexual conduct," ' 3 the Supreme Court
2 4 The majority found
reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trialY.
that despite the common law rule on the issue of consent and despite the rape
shield statute's addition of a "prohibition of evidence of the complainant's
'reputation' in such matters," an older statute allowing a witness's prior
criminal conviction to "affect [the witness's] credibility" should be allowed to
"carv[e] out an extremely narrow exception" to the rape shield law. 0 5 Thus, it

195. Chandler,65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690-91 (discussing this rule in the context of California's rape
shield law).
196. Commonwealth v. Churchill, 52 Mass. (11Met.) 538 (1846).
197.

Id.

198. See, e.g., Lynn Hecht Schafran, Writing and ReadingAbout Rape: A Primer, 66 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 979, 1010-11 (1993) (describing the stranger rape paradigm and police and prosecutor
skepticism of rapes not conforming to that mold).
199. Commonwealth v. Harris, 825 N.E.2d 58, 61 (Mass. 2005).

2co. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
201. Harris,825 N.E.2d at 62.
202.

272,

§§ 53, 53(a)

Id. at 63.

203. MASS. GEN LAWS. ANN.
204.

Harris,825 N.E.2d at 73.

205.

Id. at 63, 65, 68.

1896

ch. 233, § 21B (2008).

(20o8).

UNCHASTE AND INCREDIBLE

found that the trial judge should have considered the possibility of admitting
the evidence of prostitution.
In her dissent, Chief Justice Marshall identifies prostitution evidence as a
new frontier for gendered notions of honor. After underscoring the difficulty in
persuading juries that prostitutes are victims of rape, she cites the 1846 case
overruling Murphy as evidence that courts "have long sought means to
minimize jury bias against prostitutes.,,,,6 Contrary to the case's holding, she
argues, the Harris majority essentially invites juries to "infer that an alleged
rape victim is more likely to be fabricating an accusation of rape because she
has been convicted of a crime involving sexual conduct, such as being a
'common nightwalker."'2 7 Even though the prostitution conviction must, by
statute, be brought in "solely 'to affect [the witness's] credibility,"' she notes
that in a case "where the witness is a rape complainant who claims lack of
consent, the issue of her credibility mirrors precisely the issue of her
consent. ,2o8
With its decision in Harris, the Massachusetts Supreme Court returned to
the interconnected paths of sexual purity, credibility, and the new signpost,
consent, suggesting that chastity or the lack thereof, continues to function as
the marker of a woman's credibility. Where that marker applies has merely
shifted from all women, to any rape victim, to prostitutes. Thus, although
courts have made progress in crafting gender-neutral impeachment rules, they
are still open to the suggestion that a woman who offends sexual norms cannot
be believed. Only time will tell whether Massachusetts, which took almost
thirty years to overrule its decision in Murphy, will act more quickly this time
to re-sever the probative link between a woman's chastity and her credibility.
CONCLUSION

This Note has demonstrated that "honor," "reputation," and "truthfulness"
are gendered concepts with a powerful cultural history that continues to
reverberate in legal rules that strive for neutrality. These reverberations are not
simple oddities that may bemuse the scholar who delves into old case law and
superseded precedent. They have consequences in the courtroom and in the
imagination. The problematic of gender and honor, nonetheless, cannot be
readily extinguished through model legislation or rule changes. Its cultural

206.
207.
208.

Id. at 75 (Marshall, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 73.
Id. at 76.
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roots are too deep. At best, we can hope to explore those roots and recognize
their latest offshoots in our courts.

1898

I~I

